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ARTICLE
FREE SPEECH ON THE LAW SCHOOL
CAMPUS: IS IT THE HAMMER OR THE
WRECKING BALL THAT SPEAKS?
CHRISTOPHER J. ROEDERER*
“All truth is simple.”—Is that not a compound lie?
From the military school of life.—What does not kill me makes me
stronger.1
—Frederick Neietszche
I. INTRODUCTION
Fredrick Nietzsche wrote eloquently of using the power of the word as
a hammer to smash the false idols of his time, but his hammer was a surgi-
cal instrument compared to the wrecking ball of expressive conduct on at
least some university campuses today.2 It is lamentable to see students vio-
lently rioting at Berkeley, universities disinviting speakers because of the
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pants at the 2017 Free Speech Discussion Forum in Budapest, Hungary, particularly: Jenny Car-
roll, Dieter Do¨rr, Bill Funk, RoNell Anderson Jones, Robert Kahn, Mark Kende, John Knechtle,
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1. Frederick Nietzsche, Maxims and Arrows, in TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS AND THE ANTI-
CHRIST 23 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1968). The original German text of TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
has the subtitle, HOW TO PHILOSOPHIZE WITH A HAMMER. While it is difficult to have a discussion
with a hammer, hammers can be constructive while wrecking balls cannot.
2. For the sake of brevity, instead of referring to colleges and universities, I will generally
only refer to the latter. When I refer to universities, I intend to include colleges. I retain the term
college when discussing the works of others who use the term, or when the term is within a quote.
26
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 2  4-JAN-19 11:27
2018] FREE SPEECH ON THE LAW SCHOOL CAMPUS 27
controversial nature of their views, and administrations suppressing robust
discussions of important topics for fear of “hurt feelings.” It is also lamenta-
ble that public discourse has been reduced to personal attacks, overgeneral-
izations, and “alternative facts.” It is sad to see the pen reduced from a fine
instrument for bringing truth to power to a blunt instrument for attacking
those people who disagree with our views. It is sad our president is such a
poor role model—continuously attacking the media as an “enemy of the
people” and accusing it of creating “fake news” when it turns up facts criti-
cal of, or inconvenient for, his administration.3 Some who are offended and
hurt by insensitive language have mobilized terms like “racist,” “sexist,”
“microaggression,” and “hostile environment,” while others combat those
terms with labels such as “delicate snowflakes,” “political correctness,” and
“vindictive protectiveness.” There are racists and sexists who create hostile
learning environments as well as delicate snowflakes who scream out for
vindictive protection at the slightest threat to their comfort. I would wager,
however, that both are a very small minority. The truth is more compli-
cated. My guess is most people who make the occasional offensive com-
ment are not racists or sexists and do not intend to harass or create a hostile
environment, and those who are offended do not intend to bring the full
weight of the law down on every person who makes those comments. Most
people just want to be understood, to be respected, and to be given the
benefit of the doubt. No one wants to be reduced to a label.
Nonetheless, these terms have some appeal because they provide pow-
erful leverage in any discussion. They, like the terms “fake news” and “en-
emy of the state,” are trump cards4 (pardon the pun) that, at best, deflect or
derail the conversation, and at worst, shut down the conversation and si-
lence or discredit the other. This way of speaking perpetuates a bunker
3. See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump’s latest attack on the media is very, very danger-
ous, WASH. POST, (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/06/
donald-trumps-suggestion-that-the-media-is-covering-up-terrorist-attacks-is-genuinely-dangerous/
?utm_term=.0545e7989571; John Cassidy, Trump’s Attacks on the News Media Are Getting Even
More Dangerous, NEW YORKER (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-colum
nists/trumps-attacks-on-the-news-media-are-getting-even-more-dangerous; Dave Boyer, ‘This is
on you’: Democrats, media blame Trump for pipe bombs, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/oct/24/democrats-media-blame-donald-trump-pipe-
bombs/.
4. President Trump has used a number of terms and expressions that mobilize people behind
his views as well as terms that de-legitimize opposing views. Terms used to mobilize support
include identifying terrorist threats against us as radical Islamic terrorist threats and labeling Mex-
icans as rapists and drug dealers. Jesse Berney, Trump’s Long History of Racism, ROLLING STONE
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/trumps-long-history-of-
racism-201446/. In addition to personal attacks on media personalities, he has called the media an
enemy of the state, and continuously reiterates his mantra “fake news.” The Trump Administra-
tion’s War On The Press, MEDIA MATTERS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.mediamatters.org/trumps-
war-on-the-press.
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mentality, allowing both “sides” to stay in their silos or “safe zones.”5 This
undermines both our ability to listen and to be heard. It undermines and/or
short-circuits the hope that dialogue can result in more than counterpoints
and rise to mutual understanding.
There is evidence this polarized way of talking and thinking has in-
fected our university culture and has begun to affect our law school cul-
ture.6 There are concerns that both the Department of Education and
university administrators have gone too far in protecting students from lan-
guage that causes them discomfort.7 While some fear we have capitulated
too much to the “delicate snowflakes” by being “helicopter professors”8 and
avoiding controversial issues, I would caution against swinging too far
back.
The ball has swung from turning a deaf ear to victims of sexual assault
and harassment to what has been termed “vindictive protectionism”: shout-
ing down, drowning out, and disinviting controversial speakers;9 demand-
5. The rhetoric of sides also overgeneralizes. The victims of the polarization of our public
discourse are those who occupy the vast middle: those who do not identify as radical left or right
and really just want the truth and a functioning country. As the 2018 Mueller indictments disclose,
Russia sought to undermine our democracy by exploiting this polarization. Matt Apuzzo & Sharon
LaFraniere, 13 Russians Indicted as Mueller Reveals Effort to Aid Trump Campaign, N.Y. TIMES,
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/russians-indicted-mueller-elec
tion-interference.html. As the prosecutors state, “The Russians stole the identities of American
citizens, posed as political activists and used the flash points of immigration, religion and race to
manipulate a campaign in which those issues were already particularly divisive . . . .” Id. As
Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein stated, “The indictment alleges the Russian conspira-
tors want to promote discord in the United States and undermine public confidence in democ-
racy. . . . We must not allow them to succeed.” Id. Russia has continued to sow divisiveness in the
wake of the February 2018 Florida school shooting. Geoff Brumfiel, As An American Tragedy
Unfolds, Russian Agents Sow Discord Online, NPR, (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sec
tions/thetwo-way/2018/02/16/586361956/as-an-american-tragedy-unfolds-russian-agents-sow-dis
cord-online.
6. See infra notes 288-313 (sections IX and X). I argue both the impact on law school
culture is different and law school culture is better equipped to address this impact than the gen-
eral campus culture. See infra section X.
7. See History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY
PROFESSORS (June 2016), https://www.aaup.org/file/TitleIXreport.pdf [Hereinafter AAUP Re-
port]. Legal academics, such as Eugene Volokh, have voiced concern over this issue as far back as
1995. Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563
(1995); see also Azhar Majeed, The Misapplication of Peer Harassment Law on College and
University Campuses and the Loss of Student Speech Rights, 35 J.C. & U.L. 385 (2009); and
Benjamin Dower, Note, The Scylla of Sexual Harassment and the Charybdis of Free Speech: How
Public Universities Can Craft Policies to Avoid Liability, 31 REV. LITIG. (2012).
8. See Emily Grant, Helicopter Professors, 53 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017) (“Helicopter
professors, like their parenting counterparts, hover over students, guiding them precisely, and
swooping in to rescue them from any hint of failure or challenge. Just as helicopter parenting can
be harmful to children, helicopter professoring poses similar threats to students, not the least of
which is creating disengaged students dependent on professors for all aspects of their learning and
development.”).
9. Note while some see this as part of a free speech crisis on campus, others have argued
this “crisis” is a fabrication. Chris Ladd, There Is No Free Speech Crisis On Campus, FORBES
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ing trigger warnings; avoiding difficult topics;10 and, some claim, an
overzealous enforcement of civil rights legislation (namely, Title IX) at the
expense of free speech.11 Now the ball appears to be swinging back again,
with the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) criticizing
the encroachment of government and the university on free speech,12 uni-
versities declaring “no safe spaces” from unwanted speech,13 commentators
(Sept. 23, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisladd/2017/09/23/there-is-no-free-speech-crisis
-on-campus/#6593e74428cb. As he argues:
Having lost the battle of persuasion, and largely swept from the campus environment,
right wing speakers have to be foisted onto universities from the outside. When charac-
ters like Ann Coulter, Milo Yiannopoulos, and Charles Murray appear on campus, their
appearances are funded by extremist donors and their events are orchestrated by outside
groups. Finding students among the organizers, attendees, protestors, or counter-protes-
tors is a challenge. This is theater and the university is a prop. There is virtually no
support for, or interest in these events at the schools being targeted.
10. See, e.g., Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind: In the
name of emotional well-being, college students are increasingly demanding protection from words
and ideas they don’t like. Here’s why that’s disastrous for education—and mental health, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-
the-american-mind/399356/.
11. See AAUP Report, supra note 7.
12. Id. There is reason to be concerned the “#MeToo” movement might soon suffer a similar
backlash. See Emily Yoffe, Why the #MeToo Movement Should Be Ready for a Backlash, POLIT-
ICO (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/12/10/yoffe-sexual-harass
ment-college-franken-216057. See also Amanda Marcotte, Conservative backlash against
#MeToo is coming, and soon, SALON (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/12/18/con
servative-backlash-against-metoo-is-coming-and-soon/.
13. See Letter from John (Jay) Ellison, Dean of Students in the Coll. at the Univ. of Chi., to
the Class of 2020, https://news.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/attachments/Dear_Class
_of_2020_Students.pdf. See also Richard Perez-Pena, Mitch Smith & Stephanie Saul, University
of Chicago Strikes Back Against Campus Political Correctness, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 26, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/us/university-of-chicago-strikes-back-against-campus-politi
cal-correctness.html?emc=edit_th_20160827&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=54025227&_r=0.
You will find that we expect members of our community to be engaged in rigorous
debate, discussion and even disagreement. At times this may challenge you and even
cause discomfort. Our commitment to academic freedom means that we do not support
so-called ‘trigger warnings,’ we do not cancel invited speakers because their topics
might prove controversial, and we do not condone the creation of intellectual ‘safe
spaces’ where individuals can retreat from ideas and perspectives at odds with their
own.
According to FIRE, the following fifty institutions or faculty bodies have adopted or en-
dorsed the Chicago Statement or a substantially similar statement: American University, Amherst
College, Appalachian State University, Arizona State University, Ashland University, California
State University Channel Islands, Chapman University, City University of New York, Claremont
McKenna College, Colgate University, Columbia University, Denison University, Eckerd Col-
lege, Franklin & Marshall College, Georgetown University, Gettysburg College, Johns Hopkins
University, Joliet Junior College, Kansas State University, Kenyon College, Louisiana State Uni-
versity, Michigan State University, Middle Tennessee State University, Northern Illinois Univer-
sity, Ohio University, Princeton University, Purdue University, Ranger College, Smith College,
State University of New York at Buffalo, Tennessee Technological University, The Citadel, Uni-
versity of Arkansas at Little Rock, University of Central Florida, University of Colorado System,
University of Denver, University of Maine System, University of Maryland, University of Minne-
sota, University of Missouri System, University of Montana, University of Nebraska, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of Southern Indiana, University of Virginia College
at Wise, University of Wisconsin System, Vanderbilt University, Washington and Lee University,
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criticizing the coddling of students as if they were delicate snowflakes,14
and a new president in the White House who is scaling back the Obama
administration’s aggressive approach to Title IX protections against gender
discrimination and harassment.15 This about-face with the Trump adminis-
tration is predictable for a number of reasons:
• Republican administrations have a tradition of underfunding and
understaffing agencies responsible for enforcing civil rights laws;16
• President Trump selected Jeff Sessions as his attorney general;17
• President Trump’s own brand of “free speech” is closer to a wreck-
ing ball than a hammer, often in 280 characters or less;18
Washington University in St. Louis, and Winston-Salem State University. FIRE, Chicago State-
ment: University and Faculty Body Support, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDU. (Oct. 25,
2018), https://www.thefire.org/chicago-statement-university-and-faculty-body-support/.
14. See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10. See also Charles Lipson, The Death of Campus
Free Speech—and How to Revive It, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (June 28, 2016), http://www.real
clearpolitics.com/articles/2016/06/28/the_death_of_campus_free_speech_—_and_how_to_revive
_it_131029.html.
15. Even though the Obama administration is faulted by some for the over-enforcement of
Title IX at the expense of free speech, President Obama came out strongly in favor of free speech
on campus and against disinviting controversial speakers or shielding students from content they
might not like or agree with. See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Remarks by the
President at Town Hall on College Access and Affordability (Sept. 14, 2015), https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/15/remarks-president-town-hall-college-access-and-
affordability.
16. The Republican platform of deregulation started with what some term “The Reagan
Revolution.” See Paul Moreno, Trump Can Succeed Where Even Reagan Failed, FORBES (Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/01/17/trump-can-succeed-where-even-reagan-
failed/#1e6f738b1e6f. Trump’s former chief strategist Stephen Bannon put forward the goal of
dismantling the administrative state. See Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon: Trump adminis-
tration is in unending battle for ‘deconstruction of the administrative state,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 23,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/02/23/bannon-trump-adminis
tration-is-in-unending-battle-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/?utm_term=.1e4997bo
8oal. See also Gregory Korte, The 62 agencies and programs Trump wants to eliminate, USA
TODAY (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/03/16/what-does-
trump-budget-eliminate/99223182/.
17. See Adam Serwer, The Cynical Selling of Jeff Sessions as a Civil-Rights Champion, THE
ATLANTIC, (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/the-fiction-of-
jeff-sessions-civil-rights-champion/516237/ (“Sessions is on record opposing Supreme Court deci-
sions striking down laws banning homosexual sex and same-sex marriage and he opposed the
repeal of the policy forbidding gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military. He voted against
the Lilly Ledbetter Act, the Violence Against Women Act, and said it would be a ‘stretch’ to
describe grabbing a woman’s genitals, as the president once bragged about doing, as sexual as-
sault.”). Sessions has already withdrawn the guidance given under the Obama administration on
Title IX and transgender bathrooms. See Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement by
Attorney General Jeff Sessions on the Withdrawal of Title IX Guidance, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-jeff-sessions-
withdrawal-title-ix-guidance.
18. There are too many Trump statements over the years depicting women as sexual objects
to document here. See generally, Claire Cohen, Donald Trump sexism tracker: Every offensive
comment in one place, THE TELEGRAPH, (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/poli
tics/donald-trump-sexism-tracker-every-offensive-comment-in-one-place/; Karen Tumulty,
Trump’s history of flippant misogyny, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/trumps-history-of-flippant-misogyny/2015/08/08/891f1bec-3de4-11e5-9c2d-ed991d
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• President Trump has come out strongly in defense of extreme
speakers like Milo Yiannopoulos, threatening to defund the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley for disinviting him as a speaker;19 and
finally;
• President Trump appointed Betsy DeVos as Education Secretary,
who quickly began revisiting the Obama policies in this area.20
Is President Trump our free speech hero, or does his brand of free
speech threaten to drown out, silence, and marginalize women and minori-
ties on campus? No doubt, part of President Trump’s popularity came from
a perception that the jackboots of political correctness were silencing signif-
icant portions of the electorate—primarily a subset of white men who may
feel they are stopped from saying what they want to say in the way they
want to say it, or who believe their heritage or privilege is being threatened.
But is the antidote to the chilling effect of “political correctness” and the
overzealous enforcement of one aspect of Title IX to take the gloves off in
all out ad hominem attacks on women, minorities, and anyone else who
disagrees with one’s views?21 Does the “Trump approach” to speech on
848c48_story.html?utm_term=.1dbc1e62d123. President Trump announced on Twitter the United
States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the
U.S. Military. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump. In spite of his comments “we should come together as one,” Presi-
dent Trump has received heavy criticism from the Democrats as well as Republicans for his treat-
ment of the event in Charlottesville, VA in August 2017, particularly his condemnation of the
“egregious display of hatred, bigotry and violence on many sides — on many sides.” See, e.g.,
Erick Woods Erickson, What Trump Got Wrong on Charlottesville, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/opinion/trump-charlottesville-white-supremacy.html. See
also Kyle Feldscher, Republican Senators Call Charlottesville Crash, Domestic Terrorism, Call-
out Trump, WASH. EXAMINER, (Aug. 12, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/republican-
senators-call-charlottesville-crash-domestic-terrorism-call-out-trump/article/2631371. Approxi-
mately three days after the initial statement, President Trump did come out and condemn the
KKK, Neo-Nazis and White Supremacists by name. See, e.g., Trump Condemns White
Supremacists, KKK, Neo-Nazis by Name, FOX NEWS (Aug. 14, 2017), http://insider.foxnews.com/
2017/08/14/trump-condemns-white-supremacists-kkk-neo-nazis-name.
19. Trump, via tweet, threatened to deny funds to the University of California at Berkeley for
the riots that shut down a scheduled speech by Yiannopoulos. Rebecca Savransky, Trump threat-
ens funding cut if UC Berkeley ‘does not allow free speech’, THE HILL (Feb. 2, 2017), http://the
hill.com/homenews/administration/317494-trump-threatens-no-federal-funds-if-uc-berkeley-does-
not-allow-free.
20. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, DeVos Says She Will Revisit Obama-Era Sexual Assault Poli-
cies, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/us/devos-college-sexual-
assault.html. Signaling the view of the Office for Civil Rights, Candice Jackson, who leads the
office under DeVos, made the shocking statement that, “90 percent [of sexual assault accusations
on campus] fall into the category of ‘we were both drunk,’ ‘we broke up, and six months later I
found myself under a Title IX investigation because she just decided our last sleeping together
was not quite right.’” See Erica L. Green & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Campus Rape Policies Get a
New Look as the Accused Get DeVos’s Ear, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/07/12/us/politics/campus-rape-betsy-devos-title-iv-education-trump-candice-jack
son.html?_r=0. Jackson apologized and DeVos’s comments on the topic are more measured.
21. Free speech has costs, if not limits. As Mr. Yiannopoulos has discovered, even the pri-
vate marketplace has decided enough is enough when it comes to speech that harasses or that
condones or makes light of sexual abuse, particularly the abuse of children. Thus, Yiannopoulos
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campus actually move the discussion forward? Is this kind of speech de-
signed to move the discussion forward, or is it meant as an assault,22 or to
incite a visceral response, to misdirect our frustrations and anger, and to
sidetrack us? Is the asymmetrical expressive conduct of protests, riots, dis-
invitations, suspensions, firings, or other forms of discipline much worse?
Free speech advocates generally think of these forms of expression as heck-
ler’s vetoes.23 While these forms of expression are more blunt or obtuse
than some bigoted and sexist speech, both tend to shut down the conversa-
found his Twitter account, the publication of his autobiography, and his appearance at the Con-
servative Political Action Conference in February 2017 all cancelled. See Abby Ohlheiser, Analy-
sis: The 96 hours that brought down Milo Yiannopoulos, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 21, 2017), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-milo-yiannopoulos-resignation-analysis-
20170221-story.html. Twitter ultimately cancelled Mr. Yiannopoulos’s account (it had been sus-
pended several times before for bigoted comments) after he and other Twitter trolls attacked Afri-
can American actress Leslie Jones, one of the stars of the new Ghostbusters movie. See Mike
Isaac, Twitter Bars Milo Yiannopoulos in Wake of Leslie Jones’ Reports of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES
(July 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/technology/twitter-bars-milo-yianno
poulos-in-crackdown-on-abusive-comments.html. Simon and Schuster cancelled publishing his
autobiography after he made comments seemingly endorsing and/or making light of pedophilia.
See Feliks Garcia, Milo Yiannopoulos’ Book Deal was Just Cancelled, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb.
20, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/milo-yiannopoulos-book-
deal-canceled-simon-schuster-paedophilia-podcast-dangerous-a7590706.html. His appearance at
the Conservative Political Action Conference in February 2017 was also cancelled soon thereafter
for the same reason. Adam Edelman, Milo Yiannopoulos Disinvited from CPAC After Recording
Resurfaces of Him Discussing Pedophilia, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www
.nydailynews.com/news/politics/milo-yiannopoulos-disinvited-cpac-pedophilia-comments-article-
1.2977414.
22. As R. George Wright notes, “If at least some instances of campus hate speech are, and
are intended to be, largely assaultive speech, or akin to the tort of battery committed through the
medium of words, the idea of counterspeech may be not only unresponsive, but itself undigni-
fied.” R. George Wright, Campus Speech and the Functions of the University, 43 J.C. & U.L. 1,
20 (2017).
23. While it may seem like hecklers have silenced speech in these cases, many of them are
not actual “heckler’s veto” cases since the state has not put its coercive force behind the private
veto. As Cheryl A. Leanza notes:
Heckler’s veto cases typically consider the appropriate behavior of local law enforce-
ment when a crowd or individual threatens hostile action in response to a demonstration
or speaker. In these cases, the First Amendment grants a positive right to the speaker:
the local government must take action to protect the speaker against a hostile crowd.
The courts do not allow local law enforcement to accede to a heckler’s veto.
Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 1305, 1306 (2007) (internal citations omitted). More recently, Brett G. Johnson
notes:
U.S. pundits and free-speech advocates have bemoaned recent examples of private re-
strictions being placed on controversial—yet otherwise protected—speech due to mass
protests from unhappy or offended audiences. Controversial public figures have chosen
not to speak at events at both private and public colleges and universities due to intense
outcry from student groups opposed to those speakers. Popular social networking sites
have been criticized for removing controversial user-generated content from their plat-
forms due to criticism from users who find the content offensive. Artists have been
forced to remove their art from display on public property due to public disgust toward
the art’s controversial (or at least misunderstood) message. . . In the wake of these
incidents, the term “heckler’s veto” has been used (predominantly by right-leaning me-
dia, though also by mainstream outlets) to describe the act of one group attempting to
silence the controversial speech of others.
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tion.24 There must be better ways to move the discussion forward on univer-
sity and law school campuses. Perhaps we could all use some de-escalation
training.25
This paper addresses a number of questions related to free speech on
university and law school campuses:
1. Should campuses be treated the same as public spaces or forums
in our broader society?
2. Are the norms, expectations, and limits of free speech the same on
university campuses as they are in society?
3. Are law school campuses different yet?
4. Why aren’t law schools experiencing the same level of problems
with expressive conduct that universities are? (Or are they?)
5. Why hasn’t the law school profession had the same reaction to
restrictions of speech on campus as the larger academy? (Or has
it?)
6. Should society’s free speech norms inform law school campus
norms, or is there some virtue in law school community norms
informing societal norms—or at least university campus norms?
7. Is the answer some form of de-escalation? (Should there be more
tailored sanctions for the range of harms and more emphasis on
restorative justice?)
This article begins by assessing Alexander Tsesis’s article, Campus
Speech and Harassment, and his treatment of how traditional doctrine re-
lated to protected and unprotected categories of speech informs campus free
speech codes.26 Here, I will argue the law school campus is more akin to a
European town square (where free speech rights are balanced against other
rights, values, and duties) than to a U.S. town square (where it is sometimes
thought free speech is both our first right and the most important right,
Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and Jurisprudence to Un-
derstand Current Audience Reactions Against Controversial Speech, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 175,
175-77 (2016).
24. If they do not shut it down, they at least degrade the discussion to the point of a virtual
food fight. One need only look at the virtual shouting matches in the comments to articles, blog
posts, and Twitter feeds. It is not clear what value this speech has, except as perhaps a way of
letting off steam. Even here, it is not clear if this form of venting reduces harm or incites it.
25. See Los Angeles Police Institute De-Escalation Policy To Avoid Shootings, NPR NEWS
(Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/19/524751627/los-angeles-police-institute-de-escala
tion-policy-to-avoid-shootings. See also Tom Jackman, National Police Groups Add ‘De-Escala-
tion’ To New Model Policy on Use of Force, WASH. POST, (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/01/17/national-police-groups-add-de-escalation-to-new-
model-policy-on-use-of-force/?utm_term=.c52278e473ed (interview with Joe Domanick, Associ-
ate Director of the Center of Media, Crime and Justice at the John Jay College of Criminal
Justice).
26. See Alexander Tsesis, Campus Speech and Harassment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1863 (2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 9  4-JAN-19 11:27
34 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1
trumping all else).27 While I endorse a balancing approach, which I believe
is impossible to avoid in this context, I acknowledge it is difficult to get the
balance right.28 Next, I will address a number of legitimate limits on free
speech that are particularly salient in the campus context. Then, I will ad-
dress the AAUP Report, The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX (the
AAUP Report) and its analysis of how the over-enforcement of Title IX by
the government and by universities harms free speech on campus and ar-
guably gets the balance wrong. While I am sympathetic to the AAUP Re-
port, I do not agree that the government has gotten it wrong, and I do not
agree that the AAUP Report has gotten the balance right in all respects. The
problem might not be with the law, as much as it is with campus culture and
our broader social culture. While the AAUP Report addressed some of
these issues, the problem of campus culture is primarily addressed in the
work of other authors. After analyzing this literature, I will turn to law
school culture, and argue it is different from our current political culture
and the culture on campuses in general. Further, the law school community
is well placed to confront many of the challenges raised by the AAUP and
others. I argue law school culture may in fact be conducive to a healthier
balance between free speech, the missions of institutions of higher learning,
and the goals of civil rights legislation to provide equal opportunities to all
students.
II. CATEGORIES OF UNPROTECTED SPEECH APPLIED TO CAMPUS SPEECH:
THE U.S. TOWN SQUARE
Alexander Tsesis, in Campus Speech and Harassment, argues the Su-
preme Court’s First Amendment doctrine on true threats, fighting words,
and defamation should inform campus free speech codes and be used to
27. Akhil Reed Amar, The First Amendment’s Firstness, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1015, 1017-
19 (2014). The First Amendment was the proposed Third Amendment; it only became first in our
text because the two preceding amendments did not get enough support for ratification. Id. at
1017.
28. I am not advocating that one balance First Amendment free speech rights against a gener-
alized set of harms. This is not a matter of deontological rights versus utilitarian consequences.
The balance is often between conflicting rights (e.g. between the free speech rights of individuals
and an institution’s speech and associational rights; or individual free speech rights and the rights
of others to equal educational opportunities). Even authors like Erica Goldberg, who attempts to
cabin-in free speech consequentialist analysis, acknowledge an individual’s interest in education is
a tangible and compelling interest more akin to a conduct harm than a speech harm. Erica
Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 733 (2017). As such, under
her analysis, harms to one’s educational interests are worthy of protection from unfettered free
speech where other speech-related harms are not. Id. at 721-25, 739–44. Like the Supreme Court
in Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999), Goldberg has a very high stan-
dard for when speech rises to this level: namely, the Davis standard, wherein “a plaintiff must
establish sexual harassment of students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and
that so undermines and detracts from the victims’ educational experience, that the victim-students
are effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and opportunities.”
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determine their constitutionality.29 Thus, Tsesis would require that, “For
universities to restrict student incitement, there must be a high likelihood
that uncensored advocacy will result in imminent illegal conduct or that it
will instigate violence.”30 Moreover, for an utterance to be punishable by a
public university, “substantive evil must be extremely serious and the de-
gree of imminence extremely high.”31 The university could also punish in-
tentionally threatening speech32 and fighting words, namely “expressions
that are likely to instigate a reasonable listener to respond violently.”33 But,
as he notes, merely vulgar insults would not suffice.34 In the few lower
court cases Tsesis addresses, campus codes that have been evaluated against
First Amendment free speech doctrine were either void for vagueness35 or
overbroad.36 These codes failed, in part, because they went beyond prohib-
iting fighting words, true threats, and incitement of imminent lawless ac-
tion. These are tough standards to meet, on or off campus.37 This approach
29. Tsesis primarily addresses Title VI race discrimination on campus rather than Title IX
sex discrimination. Tsesis, supra note 26.
30. Id. at 1892.
31. Id. Tsesis goes on to note, “[h]owever, there are alternative First Amendment considera-
tions that allow college administrators to limit other forms of low value speech, even in the ab-
sence of imminent illegality.” Id.
32. Id. at 1892-95.
33. Id. at 1896.
34. Tsesis, supra note 26 at 1896.
35. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding the
code was unconstitutionally vague because the term “offensive” was not defined in the code pro-
vision that prohibited “intentional or unintentional, physical, verbal, or nonverbal behavior that
subjects an individual to an intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational, employment or living
environment.”). In Dambrot, the Court distinguished the university code from content-neutral
fighting-word statutes. See id. at 1184. See also Tsesis, supra note 26, at 1907-08.
36. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding
the prohibition of speech that stigmatized or victimized groups or individuals was overbroad be-
cause it would allow for the university to proscribe the speech it found offensive). Tsesis, supra
note 26, at 1903-05. See also UWM Post v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163,
1180-1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding a provision in the campus code that prohibited intentionally
making degrading comments based on race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orienta-
tion, national origin, ancestry, or age was overbroad. Although the code included the narrowing
scienter requirement of intent, it went beyond the limits of the fighting words doctrine). Id. at
1180-81. See also Tsesis, supra note 26, at 1906-07.
37. Federal law under Title VI provides more room and authority for campuses to regulate
speech to avoid “hostile environments.” Tsesis, supra note 26, at 1897-1903. Tsesis does not
directly address Title IX protections for gender and sex discrimination on campus, but Title IX
was largely modeled on Title VI. As noted by the Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District:
Title IX was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, . . . which is parallel
to Title IX except that it prohibits race discrimination, not sex discrimination, and ap-
plies in all programs receiving federal funds, not only in education programs. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. The two statutes operate in the same manner, conditioning an
offer of federal funding on a promise by the recipient not to discriminate, in what
amounts essentially to a contract between the Government and the recipient of
funds. . . . That contractual framework distinguishes Title IX from Title VII, which is
framed in terms not of a condition but of an outright prohibition. Title VII applies to all
employers without regard to federal funding and aims broadly to “eradicat[e] discrimi-
nation throughout the economy.” . . . Thus, whereas Title VII aims centrally to compen-
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arguably gives the most protection possible to freedom of speech and stops
the government from silencing ideas or views it finds distasteful or
offensive.
While there is some virtue to this approach,38 it tends to oversimplify
free speech issues by putting speech into inflexible categories, which pre-
supposes that a campus is akin to the town square or public forum.39 This
approach undervalues other competing constitutional norms grounded in the
Equal Protection Clause.40 It also fails to give sufficient weight to the
norms, values, and First Amendment freedoms of educational institutions in
sate victims of discrimination, Title IX focuses more on “protecting” individuals from
discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal funds.
524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998).
38. While Tsesis’ article is nuanced, there is a disconnect between these very high free
speech standards on the one hand and the more nebulous impact of civil rights legislation on the
other. It is not completely clear how he would do the balancing in cases involving civil rights
legislation. He does not suggest the detailed approach to balancing that he proposed in Mul-
tifactoral Free Speech, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1017, 1030 n.68 (2016) (arguing “judges should
apply a rigorous multifactoral test that evaluates whether any relevant communications are likely
to result in constitutional, statutory, or common law injuries; whether historical or traditional
considerations indicate the speech is protected by the First Amendment; whether there are coun-
tervailing government interests; whether the regulation is tailored sufficiently for the government
to achieve its stated aims; and whether there are any less restrictive means for achieving underly-
ing policies” in the context of corporate political speech, aggregate political contributions, and
commercial communications). His approach in Multifactoral Free Speech is similar to the balanc-
ing approach which Jud Mathews and Alec Stone Sweet propose for all U.S. constitutional rights
infringements in All things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the Problem of Balanc-
ing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797 (2011). The Court should also consider our international obligations under
Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, which states in part:
States Parties . . . undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end:
(a) Shall declare as an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination. . .
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recog-
nize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;
[and]
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote
or incite racial discrimination.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (Ratified by the U.S. 1994 (with reservations)).
39. Tsesis appreciates this point and the remaining points in this paragraph. He does ac-
knowledge classrooms are different from cafeterias and sidewalks on campus and he does intro-
duce balancing free speech “with other educational concerns on matters such as civility, self-
advancement, creativity, open dialogue, pursuit of social justice, informational acquisition, schol-
arship, innovation, and acculturation.” Tsesis, supra note 26, n.126 (citing to R. George Wright,
Campus Speech and the Functions of the University 5-21 (Ind. Univ. Robert H. McKinney Sch. of
Law Research, Paper No. 2016-15, 2016)), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2742891. Goldberg seems to acknowledge dormitories might not be public forums, but she argues
that the rest of the campus is a public forum, as least for the students. Goldberg, supra note 28, at
740. This is an overstatement. See infra section IV.
40. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 784-87 (1993).
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general—and in our case—of law schools in particular.41 These free speech
standards, largely developed in Supreme Court cases involving criminal lia-
bility for speech in public forums, seem out of place on a university cam-
pus. Universities have a range of forums, many of which are not public.
While criminal sanctions and even firing and student dismissals are more
like wrecking balls to some, universities have much subtler tools at their
disposal. Sanctions can run a very wide gamut, from informal to severe, that
serve a wide range of purposes connected with the university mission.42
III. IS THE CAMPUS TOWN SQUARE MORE LIKE A EUROPEAN TOWN
SQUARE THAN A U.S. TOWN SQUARE?
Campus conduct and speech codes are not typically modeled on fight-
ing words, true threats, and incitement statutes. Their point is not to limit
the most dangerous and harmful speech and protect all other speech in some
idealized marketplace of ideas. Rather, they seek to foster and maintain
healthy learning environments where everyone can benefit from the free
exchange of ideas. Many codes go further in limiting speech and expres-
sion, especially when speech or expression has the effect of impairing edu-
cation, particularly the education of minorities and women.
Campus codes must comply not only with the First Amendment but
also with federal anti-discrimination legislation found in both Title VI and
Title IX.43 Titles VI and IX bar recipients of federal funds from discriminat-
ing based on race or sex. When the federal government provides funding, it
can condition that funding on the recipient carrying out the government’s
message.44 Arguably, the message of Titles VI and IX is to provide an edu-
41. See Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 (2005) (arguing uni-
versities are First Amendment institutions that deserve deference with respect to their institutional
goals).
42. The vast majority of sanctions against speech on campus involve informal teaching mo-
ments, i.e. more speech. While the university might need to bring down the proverbial hammer, it
does not need to resort to a wrecking ball. See infra note 107, for the range of sanctions. Note
Tsesis does not pay much attention to the range of remedies or sanctions available on campus.
Many parts of the campus are not public forums. Rather, many spaces on campus are at most
limited public forums, where the state does not need to be completely neutral, and where the
university can pass reasonable regulations to ensure the forum is preserved for its intended use or
purpose (e.g., classrooms, events, etc.).
43. Tsesis acknowledges this and notes speech codes should also be informed by federal
statutory law.
44. As the Court stated in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,
“When the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University
speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not
expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.”
515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). See also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)
(plurality opinion) (upholding the Children’s Internet Protection Act under which public libraries
could not receive federal funds for internet access unless they installed software to block obscene
or pornographic images). As the plurality reasoned, “because public libraries have traditionally
excluded pornographic material from their other collections, Congress could reasonably impose a
parallel limitation on its Internet assistance programs.” Id. at 212.
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cational environment free from discrimination. As recipients, both private
and public universities have an obligation to ensure their students are not
harassed and their institutions are not hostile learning environments. The
Supreme Court has also noted in the context of government spending/fund-
ing cases that the government can “take legitimate and appropriate steps to
ensure its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”45 It is
not a stretch to argue the anti-discrimination message of Titles VI and IX
are garbled when a university provides a venue (and thereby a platform) for
speakers who argue women and/or other minorities should not be treated
equally or should not be allowed equal educational opportunities at that
very school.46 While the message is clearly undermined when a university
turns a blind eye to gender- and race-based harassment, threats, and incite-
ment to imminent violence, the message is also garbled when day-to-day
racist and sexist slurs and comments are ignored or accepted as part of
campus culture. Each and every straw may contribute to creating a hostile
environment that breaks the proverbial camel’s back of providing equal ed-
ucational opportunities to all students. This is not to say every slur, negative
comment, or use of abusive language requires a formal punishment. The
primary duty to maintain an environment that is not hostile to learning lies
with the university—not with individual students. This can be achieved, in
part, by restricting some forms of speech, but it also may be achieved by
promoting other forms of speech or expressive conduct. The institution
needs to take a balanced and measured approach to such conduct and
speech.
The somewhat delicate balancing approach that takes place between
free speech, civil rights legislation, and a university’s educational goals
may make some free speech purists uncomfortable. Although few have en-
dorsed the absolutist approach to the Free Speech clause as Justice Black
did,47 some believe hate speech is protected speech on campus.48 Authors
45. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
46. Note that in Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held it was constitutional for the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations prohibiting organizations receiving
federal funding under Title X of the Public Health Service Act from providing abortion counseling
and referrals. 500 U.S. 173, 192-94 (1991). If the government can put a gag on healthcare provid-
ers who are counseling women on health matters related to their constitutional right to choose,
then it should follow that the government can tell colleges and universities that certain types of
speech on campus create hostile environments that undermine the message of Titles VI and IX.
47. Justice Black is reputed to be the most extreme free speech absolutist to have sat on the
Court. According to Steven B. Lichtman, Justice Thomas has taken over the mantle from Justice
Black. Steven B. Lichtman, Black Like Me: The Free Speech Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas,
114 PENN ST. L. REV. 415, 420 (2009). Note even Justice Black was not an absolutist when it
came to free speech in schools, as he noted, “I have never believed that any person has a right to
give speeches or engage in demonstrations where he pleases and when he pleases.” Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
took a similar position in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419-20 (2007) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (“In light of the history of American public education, it cannot seriously be suggested that
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like Erwin Chemerinsky and Erica Goldberg are not comfortable with con-
sequentialist balancing. Both authors are concerned that our university cam-
puses will turn into European town squares, resulting in less absolute
protection for speech and more hate speech regulation used to suppress un-
popular views.49 They prefer to view universities as public forums where
the highest level of protection of speech occurs.50 As Goldberg states:
If courts followed the lead of scholars and began to seriously
evaluate empirical evidence of the harms of speech and devalue
its benefits, America’s exceptional commitment to strong free
speech protections would be greatly undermined. There is a
greater chance for courts, based on their own subjective views or
ideological priors, to decide that certain speech, even core speech,
is too harmful to be tolerated.51
The U.S. is somewhat exceptional in this regard, but it is far from clear
that being the only Western democracy which tolerates hate speech is a
badge of honor.52 Europe balances rights and responsibilities to not cause
the First Amendment “freedom of speech” encompasses a student’s right to speak in public
schools. . . . Whatever rules apply to student speech in public schools, those rules can be chal-
lenged by parents in the political process.”). I am not suggesting colleges and universities are
identical to public schools, but they are closer to schools than they are to town squares. The
Supreme Court in Widmar v. Vincent noted in dicta that universities differ in important respects
from public forums. 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981). Justice Thomas is sympathetic to content-based
restrictions on expressive conduct involving the use of burning crosses. Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 388, 394-95 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
48. Erwin Chemerinsky, Hate speech is protected speech, even on college campuses: My
Students trust colleges to control offensive speech. They shouldn’t., VOX (Oct. 25, 2017), https://
www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16524832/campus-free-speech-first-amendment-protest.
49. See Goldberg, supra note 28, at 741. While unpopular views are often suppressed in
countries like France, French hate speech laws are not intended to prohibit unpopular views, but
rather to prohibit the kind of speech that has historically incited racial hatred, violence, and
genocide.
50. It is common for those comparing free speech doctrine in the U.S. to that in Europe to
note Europe (as well as Canada and South Africa) takes more of balancing of rights approach than
a categorical approach to free speech. See, e.g., Kevin W. Saunders, A Comparative Look at
Children and Free Expression, 22 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 455, 456-57 (2013) (“The
absolute tone of the First Amendment’s direction ‘Congress shall make no law’ contrasts with
provisions of other international constitutions that seem to invite the balancing of interests.”).
Saunders contrasts the U.S. First Amendment with Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Article 10, Section 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, and the German Basic Law. Alexander Tsesis, who argues for a balancing
approach in his article, Multifactoral Free Speech, notes the European Convention on Human
Rights accepts balancing. Tsesis, supra note 38, at 1030 n.68. See also, Mathews & Sweet, supra
note 38, at 799–801 (arguing continental Europe, as well as Israel, South Africa, Canada, and the
U.K. all employ a proportionality analysis requiring a balancing approach to the limitation of
rights, and this approach is preferable to the categorical tiered approach dominating much of U.S.
Constitutional law).
51. Goldberg, supra note 28, at 702.
52. As Neville Cox notes, “it is well known that the United States asserts a firm constitu-
tional principle that the offensiveness of speech or expressive conduct is never per se a reason to
restrict it . . . . However, this viewpoint is not shared by, for example, the German Constitutional
Court or the European Court of Human Rights. . . . Rather, these courts have permitted the offen-
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harm, while the U.S. generally does not.53 For instance, the French Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man explicitly balances rights to free speech with the
duty not to abuse the right. Thus, while Article 11 states, “The free commu-
nication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of
man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom,”
it goes on in the same sentence to state that every citizen, “shall be respon-
sible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law.”54
A similar sentiment was echoed in an 1817 debate held in the United
Kingdom House of Commons, where William Lamb, otherwise known as
Lord Melbourne, stated:
It was common to speak of the power of the press, and he admit-
ted that its power was great. He should, however, beg leave to
remind the conductors of the press of their duty to apply to them-
selves a maxim which they never neglected to urge on the consid-
eration of government –“that the possession of great power
necessarily implies great responsibility.” They stood in a high sit-
uation, and ought to consider justice and truth the great objects of
their labours, and not yield themselves up to their interests or
their passions.55
Free speech is important, in part, because of the power of the spoken
and written word. As Stanley Fish notes, “Total toleration of speech makes
sense only if speech is regarded as inconsequential and unlikely to bring
about a result you would find either heartening or distressing.”56 Words can
do great harm in addition to great good.57 From an early age, we are taught
we cannot simply say whatever we wish, whenever or wherever we wish.
There are times and places to speak completely freely. There are also times
sive or immoral nature of a publication to factor into the question of whether it should be legally
prohibited.” See Neville Cox, Blasphemy, Holocaust Denial and the Control of Profoundly Unac-
ceptable Speech, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 739, 749-50 (2014) (Cox further notes “the American ap-
proach to this issue is different to that taken in the texts of all major international human rights
treaties where free speech is concerned”). Id. at 750.
53. Id. This may be an overstatement. The exceptions swallow a large amount of the general
rule. See, e.g., Goldberg supra note 28, at 703, 703-10 (arguing balancing takes place in current
free speech doctrine. As she states, “[h]arms and benefits are weighed when categorizing speech
as high or low value, when determining whether speech fits into a particular category, and when
applying the scrutiny that corresponds to particular categories of speech.”). Legal Historian Robert
Palmer notes that at the time of our founding, the individual rights to freedom of speech and press
were balanced against the communal need, which was itself conceived of as a right at that time.
Robert Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions: 1776–1791, in LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY:
CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 147 (1987).
54. See National Assembly of France, The French Declaration of the Rights of Man, THE
AVALON PROJECT (Aug. 26, 1789), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp.
55. 36 HANSARD’S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 1227 (June 27, 1817) (Habeas Corpus Suspen-
sion Bill, Speaker: Mr. Lamb (William Lamb)).
56. Stanley Fish, Fraught With Death: Skepticism, Progressivism, and the First Amendment,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (1993).
57. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81;
Rebecca L. Brown, The Harm Principle and Free Speech, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 953 (2016).
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and places where we need to take responsibility for what we say and how
we say it. This is true in the courtroom, the classroom, and on campus58—
particularly on a law school campus.
Some would much prefer the relatively bright lines of First Amend-
ment free speech protection to the hazy contextual analysis needed to deter-
mine if speech rises to the level of harassment or creates a hostile learning
environment.59 The categorical approach to free speech means that unless
speech fits into an unprotected category (such as fighting words, incitement
to eminent lawless action, obscenity, or true threats), restrictions based on
content receive the Court’s highest protection of strict scrutiny.60  Balanc-
ing implies something short of strict scrutiny and entails that some free
speech may be limited in the name of other rights or values, such as equal-
ity or dignity.61
58. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, The Case Against Free Speech, 38 SYDNEY L. REV. 407, 409-14
(2016) (noting Western liberal democracies (including the U.S.) have numerous public institutions
that “view massive restrictions on speech as essential to realizing the ends of free societies.” Id. at
409. This includes universities and schools as well as courtrooms, as evidenced by our numerous
rules of evidence. Id.).
59. See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. and U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office
for Civil Rights to President Royce Engstrom of the University of Montana (May 9, 2013), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2013/05/09/um-ltr-findings.pdf.
Under Title IX’s administrative enforcement standard and Title IV’s injunctive relief
standard, “severe or pervasive” sexual harassment can establish a hostile environment
that a university must remedy and prevent from recurring . . . . In determining whether
this denial or limitation has occurred, the United States examines all the relevant cir-
cumstances from an objective and subjective perspective, including: the type of harass-
ment (e.g., whether it was verbal or physical); the frequency and severity of the conduct;
the age, sex, and relationship of the individuals involved (e.g., teacher-student or stu-
dent-student); the setting and context in which the harassment occurred; whether other
incidents have occurred at the college or university; and other relevant factors. The more
severe the conduct, the less need there is to show a repetitive series of incidents to prove
a hostile environment, particularly if the harassment is physical. Indeed, a single in-
stance of rape is sufficiently severe to create a hostile environment.
60. Mathews and Sweet note the strict scrutiny framework is defined more by an outcome
than as a technique. Mathews & Sweet, supra note 38, at 835. The traditional categorical approach
asks judges “to sort cases into two bins that represent extremes of stringency and deference.” Id. at
846-47. Thus, if the speech is unprotected, there is near complete deference to the legislature, and
if it is protected, the test is strict and often fatal. For recent First Amendment examples where the
Court declined to balance and found the speech protected, see United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460 (2010); Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786 (2011); United States v. Alvarez,
506 U.S. 709 (2012). Some of the dissents in these cases supported balancing.
61. Balancing is not foreign to U.S. constitutional doctrine, even First Amendment doctrine.
It can be found in dormant commerce clause analysis (Pike Balancing), procedural due process
analysis (Mathews balancing), and Fourth Amendment criminal due process for searches and
seizures; it is evident in intermediate scrutiny analysis and even some forms of strict scrutiny
analysis (e.g. Justice O’Connor’s not fatal in fact), and can be found in the intersection of the Free
Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause, as well as in the areas of obscenity, defamation, com-
mercial speech, and in the areas of time manner and place restrictions, secondary effects doctrine,
incidental burdens analysis, and arguably child pornography. Although the majority in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) rejected a balancing approach to the Second Amend-
ment, the dissent of Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg used a bal-
ancing approach to argue the D.C. ban was constitutional. Id. at 689-90, 693-719.
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As Goldberg points out, unlike other provisions in the Bill of Rights,
the text of the First Amendment is absolute and does not appear to invite
any balancing.62 While this is true vis-a`-vis restrictions on Congress (“Con-
gress shall make no law . . .”), the text does not aid us in determining the
limits on other federal governmental bodies or on the states, nor does it aid
us in determining the impact of the Civil War Amendments on that right. In
fact, at the time of the founding, the “rights” provisions in many state con-
stitutions were more aspirational than obligatory. They were most com-
monly stated as constitutional principles, using the term “ought,” rather
than as guarantees backed by the term “shall,” as found in the First Amend-
ment.63 Further, it was common at the time of the founding for states to
balance free speech rights with communal needs.64
For some, balancing free speech with other rights and values means
less free speech.65 Thus, a free speech purist might not want any interven-
62. Goldberg, supra note 28, at 725-726. See also Saunders, supra note 50, at 456-57.
63. Palmer, supra note 53, at 61-86.
64. Id. at 147. Cf. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 299 (2001)
(stating he is not convinced by Palmer that the Bill of Rights antecedents in state constitutions
were not guarantees). It is questionable whether any of the first thirteen states actually had free
speech guarantees. Adams notes every right listed in the Bill of Rights had an antecedent in state
constitutions. Id. referencing the table of Antecedents of the Bill of Rights Found in the Revolu-
tionary Declaration of Rights and State Constitutions, in PATRICK T. CONLEY & JOHN P. KAMIN-
SKI, EDS., THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES xvii (1992). However, upon closer inspection, only three states mention
free speech in their charters or bills of rights. Two of the three states with a “speech clause”
(Pennsylvania and Vermont) were actually protecting the press. As their declarations state: “That
the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments;
therefore, the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained.” Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss5.html;
Constitution of Vermont, THE AVALON PROJECT (July 8, 1777), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/vt01.asp. Notice the use of term “ought” rather than “shall or must.” New York’s
free speech provision, section 11 of its bill of rights only protected the legislature and no one else,
as it stated, “[t]hat the freedom of speech and debates and proceedings in the senate and assembly
shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of the senate or assembly.” H.D. 1,
1787 Leg., 10th Sess. (Ny. 1987), http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/docu
ments/Publications_New-York-Bill-Of-Rights.pdf.
65. It is debatable whether policing speech in the name of other values decreases free speech
or increases it. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Four Observations About Hate
Speech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 368 (2009) (“Because one consequence of hate speech is
to diminish the status of one group vis-a`-vis all the rest, it deprives the singled-out group of
credibility and an audience, a result surely at odds with the underlying rationales of a system of
free expression.”); see also Catherine MacKinnon, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the
Law: A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 28 (1985) (analogizing the silencing effect of
pornography on women to a foot on women’s necks: “If somebody has got their foot on your
neck, what do you do? I don’t think you negotiate. I don’t think you compromise. I don’t think
you even address the foot on your neck in your own voice, such as it is, and attempt to persuade it
to move off. You try to figure out how to get it up off of you so that you can, among other things,
have something to say.”); cf. Brenda P. Lynch, Personal Injuries or Petty Complaints?: Evaluat-
ing the Case for Campus Hate Speech Codes: The Argument From Experience, 32 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 613 (1999) (criticizing offensive speech regulations at the university level as overbroad,
stating hate speech regulations should be narrowly tailored and should only apply to offensive
speech that has a devastating impact).
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tion until conduct or speech has risen to the level of severe harassment and
has created an environment that is clearly hostile to learning.66 Educators
and administrators who care about the education and welfare of their stu-
dents likely prefer that speech not be allowed to rise to this level, as it
would undermine the educational goals of the institution.
IV. LEGITIMATE LIMITS ON FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
In addition to not protecting fighting words, true threats, or incitement,
the First Amendment allows content-neutral time, manner, and place re-
strictions. It also permits content-based (but viewpoint-neutral) limitations
on limited-public forums and non-public forums. When the government
speaks or funds speech—or allows private speech to mix with public speech
in certain forums—it can engage in content-based restrictions on speech. In
public institutions of higher education, it is legitimate for the state to favor
speech that furthers the general mission of such institutions to attain, ex-
change, and disseminate knowledge and skills, as well as speech that fur-
thers the particular mission of the institution. Further, free speech may be
limited by the right to equality and, in particular, to what that right entails in
the context of higher education as embodied in civil rights legislation: the
right to an equal opportunity to receive the benefits of an education. The
values underlying these rights are often found in the mission statements of
law schools. Finally, when the primary objectives of limiting speech are to
comply with the requirements or objectives of civil rights legislation and/or
to ensure the institution completes its mission as an educational institution,
limitations can sometimes be justified under the secondary effects doctrine.
I address each of these limits in the remainder of this section.
A. Forums: Limited, Non-Public, and Mixed
There are numerous places and events on campus where speech can be
limited, be it in the library, the dorm room, or the classroom. Numerous
school-sponsored events like orientation, alumni events, or various events
in-between are not public forums. As the Supreme Court stated in Widmar
v. Vincent, “A university differs in significant respects from public forums
such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university’s mission is
education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university’s au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities.”67
66. In other words, no intervention until the speech amounts to a direct threat, face-to-face
fighting words, or incitement to eminent lawless action. As the AAUP Report demonstrates, some
of the reaction of colleges and universities may be driven by a fear of losing Title IX funding. See
supra note 7.
67. 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5. (1981).
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Universities—and law schools in particular—are very selective in
choosing who gets to study, work, and teach at their institutions. These
institutions are not open to all comers. Even once admitted, students are not
free to go to any class they wish, much less to speak at any time or on any
topic they wish in those classes. Similarly, professors are restricted in what
they teach—even what they write.
Likewise, universities can be selective in who they invite to speak.
Even though it is disheartening to see some controversial speakers dis-
invited, most of these cases do not actually implicate First Amendment
rights at all. If the university is paying for a commencement speaker, they
can choose to invite or disinvite anyone they wish since this would fall
under government-funded speech.68 It is more complicated if a public uni-
versity has created a public forum by opening its facilities to groups for
meetings and/or has a policy of allowing student groups to invite speakers.
In these cases, a disinvitation arguably amounts to prior restraint. If the
prior restraint is based on the content of the speech, and if the speech does
not fall into an unprotected category, then the general rule is it must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.69 A univer-
sity could take steps from the outset that would preserve forums for educa-
tional purposes, thereby not creating public forums on campus. Instead of
giving student groups free reign on their choice of speakers, a university
could impose limits and vetting processes on student group choices consis-
tent with the university’s mission.70
68. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 467 (2009) (“The Free Speech
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.”); Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015)
(“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the
content of what it says.”); See also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)
(plurality opinion) (upholding content-based filtering of the internet blocked pornography in pub-
lic libraries because neither the library general collection nor internet access at libraries were
public fora for private speech). As the plurality opinion stated, “[i]t provides Internet access, not
to ‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,’ but for the same reasons it offers other
library resources: to facilitate research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials
of requisite and appropriate quality.” Id. at 206 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834).
69. The exceptions to the general rule are numerous, as noted by Marjorie Heines; they
include:
art exhibits on particular themes; research grants for particular projects; merit-based
selection decisions by public libraries, broadcast stations, or arts and humanities endow-
ments; tax exemptions for “educational” or “charitable” groups; other tax benefits . . .
“limited public for[a]” that are legitimately “reserv[ed] . . . for certain groups or for the
discussion of certain topics”; and “academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce
resources,” including public school and college curricula.
Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 110-11 (1996).
70. For instance, Robert Post argues a university could impose stringent requirements of
professional competence on any speaker that came to campus. Robert Post, There is no 1st
Amendment right to speak on a college campus, VOX (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-
big-idea/2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college-campuses-milo-spencer-protests. For ex-
ample, I doubt there is a First Amendment right for comedians to speak on campus. In addition to
serious academics like Professors Lawrence and Strossen, Congress also invited the comedian,
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As we saw above, if the government funds speech, it can make con-
tent-based restrictions without triggering any heightened scrutiny.71 In cases
involving mixed governmental speech and private speech, the Court has
upheld content-based restrictions on private speech. The 2015 case of
Walker v. Texas is illustrative.72 In Walker, the Texas Division of the Sons
of Confederate Veterans sought to have a Confederate battle flag design
placed on the Texas license plate. The denial of the application was not
based on an unprotected class of speech, but rather on a determination that
“the design might be offensive.”73 Although the dissent considered this a
public forum akin to a miniature, state-owned billboard,74 the majority held
the license plate was government speech—not a public forum.75 If Texas
can ban a license plate design that includes the Confederate battle flag,
Adam Corolla, to testify on the issue of free speech on campus, where he told the story of having
the “plug pulled” on a show he was trying to do on the California State Northridge campus. See
Challenges to Freedom of Speech on College Campuses, OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM (July 27,
2017), https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/challenges-freedom-speech-college-campuses/. The
implication from the context of his talk was that he was somehow prohibited from doing his show
based on what he called the need for “safe spaces” and “stuffed animals.” It’s not clear, however,
if the plug was ever in, or ever pulled. One can actually buy the recording of his “No Safe Spaces”
event at Northridge on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/Safe-Spaces-California-University-
Northridge/dp/B06XDB7PCW. Note there did not appear to be any protests or disruptions during
the show. He does make fun of security for making sure he felt safe. I can watch his podcast or his
routines on T.V., on the internet, on the radio, and I can travel to go see him off campus. He even
has a movie on the topic in the works. See Bradford Richardson, ‘No Safe Spaces’: Carolla,
Prager take aim at coddled college students in new film, WASH. TIMES (June 7, 2017), https://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/7/adam-carolla-dennis-prager-take-aim-at-coddled-
col/. Is he really interested in being on campus to exchange ideas or to charge students for his
show? His testimony before congress begins by calling college students “kids” and “children” and
calling on us adults to take control. I am not sure it follows that the adults think there is any need,
or right for comedians to rent theatres on campus for their travelling shows. Were universities
required to allow Ringling Bros. on campus?
71. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
72. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2239.
73. The majority stated:
The Board explained that it had found explained that it had found “it necessary to deny
th[e] plate design application, specifically the confederate flag portion of the design,
because public comments ha[d] shown that many members of the general public find the
design offensive, and because such comments are reasonable.” The Board added, “that a
significant portion of the public associate the confederate flag with organizations advo-
cating expressions of hate directed toward people or groups that is demeaning to those
people or groups.”
Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245 (citations omitted).
74. Conversly, in his dissent, Justice Alito stated:
While all license plates unquestionably contain some government speech (e.g., the name
of the State and the numbers and/or letters identifying the vehicle), the State of Texas
has converted the remaining space on its specialty plates into little mobile billboards on
which motorists can display their own messages. And what Texas did here was to reject
one of the messages that members of a private group wanted to post on some of these
little billboards because the State thought that many of its citizens would find the mes-
sage offensive. That is blatant viewpoint discrimination.
Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2255–56 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Kennedy).
75. Id., at 2246, 2250-52.
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surely the University of Texas (or any other university) could ban the Con-
federate flag, Swastikas, nooses, and the like from campus due to their of-
fensiveness or incompatibility with its mission.76 If the state can
disassociate itself from the Sons of Confederate Veterans, shouldn’t a uni-
versity be able to disassociate itself from speakers whose messages are
anathema to the institution’s mission?77
B. The Values of Free Speech on Campus as a Legitimate Limit on
Free Speech
Legitimate limits on the free speech of professors, students, and in-
vited speakers include the values that free speech and academic freedom are
meant to achieve on campus. Free speech and academic freedom—impor-
tant ends or values in themselves—are also means to other ends. They are
instrumental in achieving other important educational values, such as devel-
oping best practices for teaching or attaining, exchanging, and disseminat-
ing values, skills, and knowledge in the classroom and beyond. Obviously,
some ways of speaking encourage not only more speech, but speech that
furthers these other important values. Conversely, some ways of speaking
76. Robert Post gives the example of the students at Yale who marched in front of the wo-
men’s dormitories chanting “No means yes, yes means anal” noting no sane university would
tolerate such expressive conduct on campus and would be entitled to institute disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Robert Post, There is no 1st Amendment right to speak on a college campus, VOX (Oct.
25, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college-cam
puses-milo-spencer-protests. Although Post does not say this, it is worth noting that the speech in
this example would not fall into the categories of fighting words, incitement, or a true threat.
77. The argument here is not watertight. Part of the analysis in Walker revolved around the
question of whether license plates have traditionally been forums for government speech or fo-
rums for private speech. Public universities are sometimes idealized as public forum paradigms
for private free speech and no one thinks public universities are, or should be, forums for govern-
ment propaganda. It does not follow, however, that universities are akin to the public sidewalk or
town square public forum. If they are free speech forums, they are forums that have an overriding
purpose or mission to educate. This would justify content-based restrictions that are consistent
with that purpose. The challenge would be to create viewpoint neutral restrictions that preserve the
forum for its intended purpose of education and pursuing its other missions. See, e.g., Students for
Life USA v. Waldrop, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1234-36 (S.D. Ala. 2016) (finding parts of the
University of South Alabama campus to be a non-public [limited public] forum, in particular the
front yard periphery, and upholding a university’s restrictions on student speech near the perime-
ter of the campus for the purposes of “(1) maintaining a visually attractive campus periphery; (2)
promoting traffic safety; (3) promoting its image as an educational institution in the community;
and (4) maintaining an apolitical or neutral viewpoint and avoiding the appearance of favoring or
endorsing a particular viewpoint.” As the court noted,
The Perimeter cannot be a designated public forum unless the University purposefully
and intentionally opened the Perimeter to general student discourse. The University’s
intent is determined by evaluating its policy concerning student speech in the Perimeter,
its practice concerning student speech in the Perimeter, the nature of the Perimeter, and
the Perimeter’s compatibility with general student discourse therein.
Id. at 1232. Cf. Justice For All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 767–69 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that
based on university policies, the University of Texas at Austin was not a limited public forum but
a “designated forum for student expression, subject only to time, place, and manner regulations
and a small number of enumerated content-based restrictions.”).
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tend to close off speech, shut down the conversation, and are less fruitful in
attaining and or disseminating knowledge. For instance, inflammatory ra-
cist, sexist, and bigoted speech that trades in stereotypes, along with any
speech that overgeneralizes, can sidetrack or shut down a conversation.
While these ways of speaking may lead to more speech, it takes more work
to get such conversations back on a fruitful track. Labeling people racist,
sexist, or bigoted can have this result for similar reasons.78 Labels are them-
selves overgeneralizations if they are meant to—or taken to—reduce a per-
son to a single dimension of their personhood. Labels shut down those who
are the objects of overgeneralization and can add limiting filters to anything
said by one saddled with the label.79 Not only is overgeneralized speech of
little value, some of it is demonstrably false.80 While false speech that ap-
peals to our worst instincts may be tolerated in the town square, it is very
difficult to justify giving false speech a platform at an educational institu-
tion. How could having false speech on campus aid the mission of an edu-
cational institution in any way? Thus, free speech, like a free market, may
require some form of intervention—or dare I say, regulation—if we wish to
optimize its benefits on campus.
C. Balancing Free Speech with Other Rights and Values, Including the
Rights and Values Embodied in Titles IX and VI and the
Specific Values of the Institution as Embodied in the
Institution’s Mission
Free speech and academic freedom must be balanced against other
rights and values, like the right to equality and what that right entails,
namely, fair equality of opportunity81 and providing equal concern and re-
78. Although it is hard to say, even those people with the most bigoted views have redeeming
virtues. They may be very hard workers, be very caring and responsible parents (except of course
to the extent they pass on their bigoted views), and they may even be gifted artists or athletes.
Take for instance, Babe Ruth, John Wayne, Woodrow Wilson, Walt Disney, or Eric Clapton. Are
any of these people reducible to their bigoted views or statements?
79. Who cares to hear what “the racist” has to say? Don’t we already know what “the Demo-
crat” or “the Republican” is going to say about any given issue, so why even listen or engage?
80. Leiter, supra note 58, at 409 (2016) (arguing most non-mundane speech “has little or no
net positive epistemic value (that is, value for helping us discover the truth) and not enough non-
epistemic value (either for the speaker or listeners) to justify its expression, regardless of the costs
to social welfare.”). Leiter does concede one serious argument against the regulation of free
speech is the “worry that in society writ large we do not have a reliable epistemic arbiter, and,
moreover, any attempt to designate one runs the risk of sacrificing all the other goods associated
with free speech insofar as the arbiter is unreliable or makes too many errors.” Id. at 434. Of
course, academic institutions are not society “writ large” and, not unlike courts, are in the business
of arbitrating epistemic claims.
81. John Rawls’s view of democratic equality is embodied in his two principles of justice.
His first principle provides for equal basic liberties, e.g. free speech, while his second principle
provides for both fair equality of opportunity and redistribution of wealth to the least well off.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-61 (1971). As Norman Daniels notes, “[F]air equality of
opportunity requires that we not only judge people for jobs and offices by reference to their
relevant talents and skills, but that we also establish institutional measures to correct for the ways
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spect.82 Title IX, like Title VI, embodies these conceptions of the right to
equality grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment.83 Title IX provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.84
Finally, academic institutions must balance the free speech and aca-
demic freedom of individual professors and students with the institution’s
First Amendment rights to have a distinct mission and set of values.85 Al-
though the scope of a university’s First Amendment rights is anything but
settled, the Supreme Court has endorsed the First Amendment rights of uni-
versities to count diversity as a compelling interest in achieving their educa-
tional missions.86
George Wright recently collected a wide range of university functions
and purposes from university mission statements, the statements of univer-
sity presidents, and scholars.87 The culminate list of university functions
include:
in which class, race, and gender might interfere with the normal development of marketable tal-
ents and skills.” Democratic Equality: Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism, in 6 THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO RAWLS 241 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
82. Ronald Dworkin has defended the idea that for a democratic government to be legitimate
it must treat individuals equally, at least in the sense of providing equal concern and respect. See
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2000); see also RONALD DWORKIN TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY (1978).
83. Even if as a matter of law, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is justified
under Congress’s spending powers, the purpose for the strings attached to the programs funded by
Title IX are “to avoid the use of federal resources to support sexually discriminatory practices in
education programs, and to provide individual citizens effective protection against those prac-
tices.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
84. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (West 2018).
85. See, e.g., Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, supra note 41; Paul Horwitz, Universities
as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Some Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L.
Rev. 1497 (2007). Horwitz argues universities should be considered “First Amendment institu-
tions,” namely “institutions that play a significant role in contributing to public discourse, and that
are both institutionally distinct and largely self-regulating according to a set of internally gener-
ated norms, practices, and traditions.” Id. at 1497. He further argues that courts “should allow
universities considerable scope to define the exercise of their autonomy according to their own
sense of academic mission.” Id. at 1549.
86. The Court in Grutter v. Bollinger recognized that universities, “occupy a special niche in
[the] constitutional tradition of the First Amendment,” and are entitled to substantial “educational
autonomy.” 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). Note, however, the First Amendment was not mentioned in
the recent cases of Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U. S. 297 (2013), although the majority
of the court still deferred to the University’s diversity-related educational goals. While these cases
involved public universities, First Amendment free speech rights would attach to both public and
private universities vis-a vis the government. In other words, even though private universities are
not bound by the First Amendment, they are protected by it. Note that in July of 2018, the Trump
administration revoked twenty-four policy documents from the Obama administration, including a
memo that supported the use of race as a factor in admissions. Eric Tucker, Trump revokes Obama
policy using race in school admissions, CHICAGO SUN TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://chicago.sun
times.com/education/affirmative-action-college-school-admissions/.
87. See Wright, supra note 22, at 4-11.
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[L]earning and research; anti-discrimination; providing educa-
tional opportunities and making societal contributions; advance-
ment of knowledge; freedom of expression and communication;
promoting economic growth; disinterested scholarship; serving as
societal critic; moral cultivation of the students; professional
training; preparation for competent democratic citizenship; re-
flecting or determining status and opportunity hierarchies or pro-
moting social mobility; and fundamental personal
transformation.88
Law school missions are also shaped by standards that govern all
ABA-accredited law schools. For instance, ABA Standard 205(b) requires
law schools to “foster and maintain equality of opportunity for students,
faculty, and staff, without discrimination or segregation on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disabil-
ity.”89 Further, ABA Standard 206 requires law schools to:
[D]emonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and
inclusion by providing full opportunities for the study of law and
entry into the profession by members of underrepresented groups,
particularly racial and ethnic minorities, and a commitment to
having a student body that is diverse with respect to gender, race,
and ethnicity.90
Interpretation 206-2 states in part:
The commitment to providing full educational opportunities for
members of underrepresented groups typically includes a special
concern for determining the potential of these applicants through
the admission process, special recruitment efforts, and programs
that assist in meeting the academic and financial needs of many of
these students and that create a favorable environment for stu-
dents from underrepresented groups.91
Law schools have a variety of missions, but many emphasize justice
and professional ethics. For instance, the University of St. Thomas School
of Law mission states, “The University of St. Thomas School of Law, as a
Catholic law school, is dedicated to integrating faith and reason in the
88. Id. at 10-11 (internal citations omitted).
89. See Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools
2014-2015, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/
Standards/2014_2015_aba_standards_chapter2.authcheckdam.pdf.
90. Id. Note Interpretation 206-1 goes on to state that:
The requirement of a constitutional provision or statute purports to prohibit considera-
tion of gender, race, ethnicity, or national origin in admissions or employment decisions
is not a justification for a school’s non-compliance with Standard 206. A law school is
subject to such constitutional or statutory provisions would have to demonstrate the
commitment required by Standard 206 by means other than those prohibited by the
applicable constitutional or statutory provisions.
Id.
91. Id.
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search for truth through a focus on morality and social justice.”92 The
school’s values include: professional formation, Catholic service, scholar-
ship, innovation, community, and relationships.93 On this last point, the
University of St. Thomas states:
We take relationships seriously both inside and outside the class-
room. The practice of law is a social endeavor, and we help stu-
dents to develop the practical skills and emotional intelligence
lawyers need to engage and nurture all relationships.94
Florida Coastal School of Law’s mission statement provides that:
Florida Coastal sets itself apart on the basis of its culture, a stu-
dent outcome-centered orientation, a commitment to professional
preparation, educational experience, service to underserved com-
munities, and accountability of the faculty for market-leading stu-
dent outcomes. These distinguishing characteristics aim toward
establishing Florida Coastal as the benchmark of inclusive excel-
lence in professional education for the 21st Century. In further-
ance of this mission, it is committed to achieving the following
objectives:
• Provide a program of legal education designed to qualify
graduates for admission to the Bar and enable them to
participate effectively in the legal profession.
• Offer an educational experience that prepares students to
deal with both current and anticipated legal problems, re-
sponds to globalization, emphasizes skills training and
professionalism, and facilitates appreciation for cultural
diversity.
• Attract a diverse student body, faculty, and staff moti-
vated by the law school community’s values and ideals.
• Create an institutional climate that fosters respect, trust,
collaboration, and meaningful interaction among stu-
dents, faculty, and staff. . . .95
Both the University of St. Thomas and Florida Coastal have harass-
ment policies that reinforce their missions and objectives and seek to bal-
ance them with free speech and academic freedom. For instance, the
University of St. Thomas’s sexual misconduct policy includes the following
clarification:
The prohibition of sexual harassment does not circumscribe a
faculty member’s freedom as part of the faculty member’s teach-
ing to select, assign or discuss materials or topics that are legiti-
92. About, UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS, https://www.stthomas.edu/law/about/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2018).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Our Mission, FLORIDA COASTAL SCHOOL OF LAW, https://www.fcsl.edu/our-mission.html
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
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mately related to the subject being taught. In the classroom and
other forums, St. Thomas actively encourages and seeks to facili-
tate the free expression, challenge and debate of diverse and
deeply held beliefs and opinions.96
Nonetheless, sexual harassment can be verbal or physical and a single
incident can constitute harassment.97 As one example of harassment, the
policy lists “[o]ther severe or pervasive conduct that creates a hostile work
or educational environment.”98 Thus, the University of St. Thomas’s policy
echoes the “Dear Colleague” letter from the Office for Civil Rights of the
Department of Education addressed in Section V(A) below.
Florida Coastal’s policy defines sexual harassment as “unwelcome[;]
[s]exual, sex-based and/or gender-based[;] [v]erbal, written, online and/or
physical conduct.”99 Florida Coastal’s policy notes harassment can be pun-
ished when it creates a hostile environment.100 The policy further states:
A hostile environment is created when sexual harassment is:
• Severe, or
• Persistent or pervasive, and
• Objectively offensive, such that it unreasonably interferes
with, denies or limits someone’s ability to participate in
or benefit from the School’s education or employment
opportunities.101
Florida Coastal’s policy, like that of many other institutions, goes on to
address harassment that does not rise to this level or is not based on a pro-
tected class. It states, “Addressing such behaviors may not result in the
imposition of discipline under the School policy, but will be addressed
through respectful confrontation, remedial actions, education and/or effec-
tive conflict resolution mechanisms.”102
These policies clearly limit free speech. Arguably, the limits are based
on the content or type of speech. However, the focus is not on the idea, but
on the effect of the speech on the educational opportunities of those af-
96. See Sexual Misconduct Policies and Procedures, UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS, http://
www.stthomas.edu/title-ix/sexualmisconduct/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Sexual Violence Response and Prevention, FLORIDA COASTAL SCHOOL OF LAW, http:/
/www.fcsl.edu/student-life-student-affairs-sexual-violence-response-and-prevention.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 27, 2018).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. This language is common. See, e.g. the Stetson University policy at: https://
www.stetson.edu/other/title-ix/media/titleix-policy-2017-18-updated.pdf. The University of Day-
ton’s nondiscrimination policy has the exact same language in its section on “Other Objectionable
Conduct.” https://udayton.edu/policies/finance/nondiscrimination-policypage.php#otherobject
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018). It simply adds that in addition to these other mechanisms, the conduct
may also be “referred to other University officials to address according to applicable University
policy.” Id.
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fected. The speech prohibited here does not necessarily fit into, or rise to
the level of, the traditional categories of unprotected speech (namely fight-
ing words, incitement, true threats, or obscenity) although some of it may.
Nonetheless, if one balances free speech with the need for law schools to
provide equal opportunity and an environment conducive to institutional
goals, policies prohibiting harassing language are justified.
D. Can These Limits be Addressed under the Secondary Effects
Doctrine?
Under the secondary effects doctrine, a law that is facially content-
based may be deemed content-neutral if it is aimed at achieving a permissi-
ble content-neutral goal and there are reasonable alternative avenues for
expression.103 When the “predominate” concern is with the secondary ef-
fects and not with the content, courts have upheld what appear to be con-
tent-based regulations.104 A number of cases have upheld content-based
discrimination against adult-oriented businesses in order to “protect and
preserve the quality of the city’s neighborhoods, commercial districts, and
the quality of urban life.”105 Given this, does it not follow that universities
should be able to discriminate against expressive conduct on campus in
order to preserve the quality of campus life and culture?106 Could a univer-
sity prevent or deny a lease to an adult/sex shop in the student union if it
allowed other private shops? Do campus bookstores have adult sections?
Could a public university ban that section if vendors wanted to provide it?
If so, could it also decline to lease to a hate group that wished to rent an
auditorium for meetings or a speech? If a city or university could “zone
out” sex-related expression, shouldn’t it be able to “zone” out hate-related
expression? Note, students can access nearly every form of speech imagina-
ble online. There are ample YouTube videos of nearly every disinvited
speaker on the list maintained by the Foundation for Individual Rights in
Education (FIRE). Students can access their literature, websites, blogs, and
tweets; they can attend events in venues off-campus and in town. In other
words, there are numerous reasonable alternative venues.
Universities have a whole range of mechanisms to address student,
faculty, and staff conduct that is inconsistent with the institution’s mission
103. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (“ ‘[C]ontent-
neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a
substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication.”).
104. Id. at 47.
105. Id. at 48; Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
106. In Gainesville, Florida, home to the University of Florida, the city has effetely zoned out
all adult businesses based on a secondary effects argument. See Aaron Albright & Justin Ford,
Strict regulations leave no space for adult stores in Gainesville, THE INDEPENDENT FLORIDA ALLI-
GATOR (Apr. 2017), http://www.alligator.org/news/local/article_7dd781f4-24b3-11e7-8a49-0f852
a2ec2d3.html.
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or values.107 Institutions have fewer tools for dealing with outside speakers
who come onto campus and engage in expressive conduct that undermines
its mission.108 Universities cannot help but engage in content-based dis-
crimination in deciding who to invite to campus to speak. As noted above,
the controversy arises when a university decides to disinvite a speaker a
student group has chosen to invite, or in some cases where the university
declines to rent space to an outside speaker.109 Partly because universities
do have limited tools at their disposal to address speech that violates cam-
pus norms, disinvitation may be the only tool available to avoid providing a
platform for speech that is antithetical to an institution’s mission and duties
to its students.110 Other secondary effects include safety concerns and the
risk of serious physical disruption of campus activities. While it is impor-
tant not to give in to the heckler’s veto, if the purpose of the campus visit is
to incite disruption and the only way to provide security is at a great cost to
the institution and taxpayer, it is worth considering if this kind of speech
provides enough light to justify the heat caused by such events.
V. THE AAUP REPORT ON THE HISTORY, USES, AND ABUSES OF TITLE
IX, AND ITS IMPACT ON FREE SPEECH
One problem with balancing is that it is difficult to know when the
right balance is achieved. Some say we have gone too far in protecting our
students, arguing students have become coddled and sheltered.111 As noted
107. These include disseminating values and policies through various media, training sessions,
workshops, counseling, mentoring, working with student leadership and groups, informal meet-
ings, warnings, reprimands, probation, requests for apologies, special learning projects, commu-
nity service, restriction or revocation of privileges, no contact orders, or separation orders,
restitution and reparations, fines, fees, suspension, dismissal, and reporting the above to licensing
organizations, such as the state bar.
108. For instance, some universities might consider it contrary to their mission to publicly out
undocumented students on campus, or to publicly name and mock transgender students on cam-
pus. Mr. Yiannopoulos did the latter at the University of Wisconsin and was alleged to have
planned to do the former at U.C. Berkeley. Maya Oppenheim, UC Berkeley protests: Milo Yianno-
poulos planned to ‘publicly name undocumented students’ in cancelled talk, INDEPENDENT, (Feb.
3, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/uc-berkely-protests-milo-yianno
poulos-publicly-name-undocumented-students-cancelled-talk-illegals-a7561321.html.
109. See, e.g., Michigan State Refuses to Rent Space to Richard Spencer’s Group, CBS NEWS
,(Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/michigan-state-refuses-to-rent-space-to-richard-
spencers-group/. Note these cases generally assume the space is being rented out as a public forum
or a limited public forum and viewpoint discrimination is not allowed. If, however, these univer-
sity venues are seen as carrying the name and reputation of the institution, then it is difficult to see
why they cannot decline to rent to those waving a confederate battle flag in the same way Texas
declined to provide space to the flag on its license plates. Note law schools do not have this
problem, as a general rule, because they rarely rent out their space to the public.
110. An institution can counter speech with its own speech or encourage other student groups
to organize counter events. Some of these tools are detailed in the Southern Poverty Law Center’s
publication, The Alt-Right On Campus: What Students Need To Know, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW
CENTER (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/20170810/alt-right-campus-what-students-
need-know. The Center counsels against direct engagement. See infra note 283.
111. See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10. See also Lipson, supra note 14, at 2.
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above, the AAUP authored a scathing report on the abuses of Title IX in
2016, arguing the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education
(OCR), universities have undermined freedom of expression by:
• Failing to make meaningful distinctions between conduct and
speech or otherwise distinguish between hostile environment sexual
harassment and sexual assault.
• Using overly broad definitions of hostile environment to take puni-
tive employment measures against faculty for protected speech in
teaching, research, and extramural speech.
• Tending to treat academic discussion of sex and sexuality as con-
tributing to a hostile environment.
• Adopting a lower evidentiary standard in sexual harassment hear-
ings, i.e. the “preponderance of evidence” instead of the “clear and
convincing” standard.
• Increasing the corporatization of the university, which has framed
and influenced universities’ implementation of Title IX.112
While the AAUP Report attributes some of the problem to OCR’s in-
terpretation of Title IX, the AAUP Report puts much of the blame on the
“corporatization” of university administrations. The AAUP Report argues
the entrepreneurial university model, with its focus on service to students as
clients and fixation on avoiding investigations and lawsuits, may run
counter to universities’ educational missions and undermine academic free-
dom and shared governance. Specifically, the AAUP Report concludes that
this undermines rather than improves gender equality.113
A. Why Did Title IX Move from Equal Facilities to a Focus on
Harassment and Hostile Environments
Before addressing some of the more specific criticisms in the AAUP
Report, it is worth addressing why Title IX enforcement, which tradition-
ally focused on providing equal facilities, found its way into campus sexual
harassment claims and into conflict with free speech ideals under the
Obama administration.114 Historically, Title IX focused on providing equal
or equivalent athletic opportunities for women. If that were still its focus,
there would not be much for law schools to talk about, since law schools
provide little to no athletic opportunities to students. Over the last several
112. See American Association of University Professors, Executive Summary: The History,
Uses, and Abuses of Title IX (June 2016), https://www.aaup.org/report/history-uses-and-abuses-
title-ix. Note the AAUP Report does not lay the blame for these problems at the feet of professors
but does call on professors to be part of the solution by circulating the AAUP Report to their
colleagues at their institutions, which I have done. See AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 30-31.
113. See AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 24.
114. See Travis Waldron, How Obama Took an Existing Feminist Law and Made it Even
Stronger, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/obama-title-ix_
us_585afcd5e4b0eb5864851a93.
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years, however, Title IX’s focus has shifted away from gender equality in
sports to addressing “rape culture” on campuses.115 The history of cover-
ups and impunity for harassment, sexual assault, and rape on campuses
eventually led to the heightened enforcement of Title IX over the past half-
decade.116 In April of 2011, the OCR issued what is known as the “Dear
Colleague” letter, requiring federally-funded universities to take action on
sexual violence or risk losing funding.117 Athletes—particularly male ath-
letes—still seem to get the most attention even though the culture of abuse
is widespread.118 This focus on athletes is due in part to heightened media
attention, but also because universities have often sought to protect athletes
in ways they do not protect an average student. For instance, universities
115. I do not want to de-emphasize the very serious problem of rape and sexual assaults on
college campuses. I would use the term “rape culture” very carefully, if at all to describe the
culture on any given campus. Rape is a horrible crime and to claim a given campus has a rape
culture, in many cases, overstates the situation in a way that, in my opinion, is not helpful in
making progress. As Deborah Brake notes, there is presently a “culture war” over the extent to
which “rape culture” pervades college campuses and the legitimacy of the federal government’s
enforcement of Title IX in response to it. Deborah L. Brake, Fighting the Rape Culture Wars
Through the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard, 78 MONT. L. REV. 109, 110 (2017). The
central controversy, fueled by competing narratives between student survivors and students ac-
cused of sexual assault, is over whether institutional responses to campus sexual assault have gone
too far or not far enough. Id. For a critique of the term, see Aya Gruber, Anti-Rape Culture, 64 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1027 (2016). Given the events of 2017, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that we
have a sexual harassment culture.
116. See Diana Moskovitz, Why Title IX Has Failed Everyone On Campus Rape, DEADSPIN
(July 7, 2016), http://deadspin.com/why-title-ix-has-failed-everyone-on-campus-rape-
1765565925. Note the Obama administration both stepped up enforcement in this area and over-
turned Bush-era policies that allowed for less reliable means of reporting compliance. See Doug
Lederman, Reversing Bush on Title IX, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 20, 2010), https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/04/20/titleix; see also Eric Pearson, National Review: Bench-
ing The Title IX Changes, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (June 1, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=127306783.
117. See Moskovitz, supra note 116. The 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter was withdrawn in the
September 2017 “Dear Colleague” letter. Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Sec’y for
Civil Rights, U.S Dep’t of Educ. Office of Civil Rights, to Colleague (Sept. 22, 2017), http://
www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/ED-Dear-Colleague-Title-IX-201709.pdf. The new letter
does not provide substantive guidance, but announces a new notice-and-comment process and
refers the reader to the “Q&A on Campus Sexual Misconduct, issued contemporaneously with
th[e] letter, and will continue to rely on its Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, which was
informed by a notice-and-comment process and issued in 2001, as well as the reaffirmation of
guidance in the Dear Colleague Letter on Sexual Harassment issued January 25, 2006.” Id.
118. Id. Note commentators like Ann Coulter continue to make light of sexual assaults on
campus. She has argued “there is no campus rape problem” and rape isn’t really rape unless the
victim has been “hit on the head with a brick.” See also Joanna Rothkopf, Coulter: Women who
say they are raped are just “girls trying to get attention”, SALON (Dec. 18, 2014), http://
www.salon.com/2014/12/18/ann_coulter_women_who_say_they_are_raped_are_just_girls_trying
_to_get_attention/. She also stated rapists on campus are usually “Clintons or Kennedys.” See The
New Civil Rights Movement, Ann Coulter Denies College Rape Crisis: Rapists Are ‘Usually
Clintons Or Kennedys’, http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/rachelwitkin/ann_coulter_
says_that_rolling_stone_article_proves.
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may cover up athlete-related incidents or provide different procedures for
athletes, in order to protect high profile and lucrative athletic programs.119
The “Dear Colleague” letter goes well beyond the treatment by and of
athletes: it concerns every student on campus. While no university has actu-
ally lost its federal funding, OCR investigations have resulted in costly set-
tlement agreements. Although those settlement agreements often require
more than what Title IX requires on its face, they have become models for
university administrations on how to comply with Title IX.120
The AAUP Report does not oppose gender equality and its drafters do
not argue free speech should trump all other rights. Everyone is attempting
to find the right balance—the just balance.121 The drafters of the AAUP
Report fear the current approach of the government and of university ad-
ministrations to Title IX may undermine Title IX goals and exacerbate gen-
der and racial inequities on campus.122 I am hesitant to fully embrace the
AAUP Report for some of the reasons stated by Faculty Against Rape
(FAR) in its response letter to the March 2016 draft.123 My hesitancy is
over a fear that the AAUP Report may be exalting faculty interests in free
speech, academic freedom, and self-governance over students’ well-being,
safety, and in particular, right to be free from sexual harassment, discrimi-
nation, and a hostile educational environment.124 I do not believe this was
119. See Moskovitz, supra note 116. Moskovitz notes although the 2011 Dear Colleague Let-
ter requires the same procedures for all students, Baylor University still had a separate grievance
procedure for its athletic program for many years. Id. Moskovitz also provides numerous exam-
ples of cover-ups and under-enforcement of sexual assault on college campuses. Id. The cover-ups
of sexual violence at Baylor ended up with the removal of University President Kenneth Starr, as
well as the head football coach in 2016. See, e.g., Marc Tracy, Baylor Demotes President Kenneth
Starr Over Handling of Sex Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/05/27/sports/ncaafootball/baylor-art-briles-kenneth-starr-college-football.html?_r=0.
The sad irony of the situation is hard to ignore.
120. Moskovitz, supra note 116.
121. Ronald Dworkin’s admonition is particularly apt here. Because our controversies over
justice are so rich and theories so plentiful, “[p]erhaps no useful statement of the concept of justice
is available.” RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 74-76 (1986). Nonetheless, as he goes on to state,
“If so, this casts no doubt on the sense of disputes about justice, but testifies only to the imagina-
tion of people trying to be just.” Id.
122. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 10, 23-24.
123. In its conclusion FAR wrote:
[W]hile we applaud the AAUP for turning its attention to a matter of significant impor-
tance, we are seriously concerned about the manner in which it did so, the accuracy of
the report’s content, its failure to engage with a broad variety of perspectives, including
expert scholarship, and its framing may rather serve to entrench existing problems than
address them.
Letter from Members of Faculty Against Rape, FAR, to American Association of University
Professors, AAUP (Apr. 15, 2016) (on file with author).
124. The stated mission of the AAUP is to:
[a]dvance academic freedom and shared governance; to define fundamental professional
values and standards for higher education; to promote the economic security of faculty,
academic professionals, graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and all those engaged
in teaching and research in higher education; to help the higher education community
organize to make our goals a reality; and to ensure higher education’s contribution to the
common good.
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the authors’ intent, but the appearance is difficult to avoid given the AAUP
Report’s predominant focus on faculty rather than students.125
Part of the challenge in addressing Title IX and free speech concerns is
to avoid swinging the wrecking ball, to avoid the false dilemma of choosing
between the chilling effects of political correctness/vindictive protective-
ness126 and the rather callous approach to speech that is typified by Presi-
dent Donald Trump and alt-right “free speech fundamentalists” like Milo
Yiannopoulos or Candice Jackson, the current head of the Office of Civil
Rights.127 The challenge for professors who aim to professionally prepare
their students is to be sensitive to the effects of words on vulnerable people
without closing down or avoiding important and difficult conversations.128
It is easier to choose either the “callous to causing harm” option on the one
hand, or the “this is too sensitive to even discuss” option on the other hand,
than to address the messy middle ground. These two alternative ways of
bracketing off the material are arguably safer for the professor.129 Nonethe-
less, neither are appropriate in any educational setting, much less in a law
school setting. The challenge is to be able to respectfully and professionally
address sensitive issues. This may require more than being careful in how
we speak and how we shepherd conversations. It may require vulnerability,
some level of bravery, and above all, resiliency when we get it wrong.
See Mission Statement, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, https://www.aaup.org/about/mission-1
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018). Thus, it is not surprising faculty come first in a report by this
organization.
125. My hesitation goes more to tone than it does to substance.
126. As Lukianoff & Haidt note, the current movement is not the same as the political correct-
ness movement from the 1980s and 1990s:
The current movement is largely about emotional well-being. More than the last, it
presumes an extraordinary fragility of the collegiate psyche, and therefore elevates the
goal of protecting students from psychological harm. The ultimate aim, it seems, is to
turn campuses into “safe spaces” where young adults are shielded from words and ideas
make some uncomfortable. And more than the last, this movement seeks to punish any-
one who interferes with aim, even accidentally.
Supra note 10, at 26.
127. See Alexis Okeowo, Hate on the Rise After Trump’s Election, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17,
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/hate-on-the-rise-after-trumps-election (“Since
Donald Trump won the Presidential election, there has been a dramatic uptick in incidents of
racist and xenophobic harassment across the country. The Southern Poverty Law Center has re-
ported there were four hundred and thirty-seven incidents of intimidation between the election, on
November 8th, and November 14th, targeting blacks and other people of color, Muslims, immi-
grants, the L.G.B.T. community, and women.”); See also Jessica Guynn, ‘Massive rise’ in hate
speech on Twitter during presidential election, USA TODAY,  (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/10/21/massive-rise-in-hate-speech-twitter-during-presidential
-election-donald-trump/92486210/; See also note 20 (regarding the comments of Candice Jackson,
the August 2017 “white supremacist terrorist” attack in Charlottesville, VA, and related
incidents.).
128. This is a subset of the overall problem of sailing a middle course between the extremes of
protecting free speech and protecting those from sexual harassment as nicely captured by Benja-
min Dower in, The Scylla of Sexual Harassment and the Charybdis of Free Speech: How Public
Universities Can Craft Policies to Avoid Liability, supra note 7.
129. Some of us, no doubt, are somewhat delicate snowflakes ourselves.
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B. Changes from the OCR that Impact Free Speech on Campus
The OCR has sent out somewhat mixed messages in its “Dear Col-
league” letters about the protection of free speech in the pursuit of Title IX
objectives. However, its enforcement actions and settlement agreements
have spoken louder than the words in their “Dear Colleague” letters in im-
pacting the behavior of university administrators. As the AAUP Report
points out, the 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter conflates sexual harassment
conduct and speech by defining sexual harassment very broadly.130 The Re-
port authors note, however, that in 2014, the OCR issued “Questions and
Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence,” stating its 2011 “Dear Col-
league” letter did not address free-speech issues and that the prior guidance
on ensuring free speech from its 2001 and 2003 letters remained in ef-
fect.131 The earlier letters made it clear that “all actions taken by OCR must
comport with First Amendment principles, even in cases involving private
schools that are not directly subject to the First Amendment” and that
“OCR’s regulations should not be interpreted in ways that would lead to the
suppression of protected speech on public or private campuses.”132 While
the OCR discouraged the suppression of free speech at private institutions,
it did not prohibit it.133 As its 2003 letter states, “Any private post-secon-
dary institution that chooses to limit free speech in ways that are more re-
strictive than at public educational institutions does so on its own accord
and not based on requirements imposed by OCR.”134
Thus, it is worth emphasizing that when it comes to private universi-
ties, the institution is free to engage in balancing.135 Strictly speaking, the
130. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 9.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 8 (quoting Letter from Gerald A. Reynolds, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
Office for Civil Rights, to Colleague (July 28, 2003) (on file with the Dep’t of Educ.)).
133. Letter from Gerald A. Reynolds, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office for Civil
Rights, to Colleague (July 28, 2003) (on file with the Dep’t of Educ.).
134. Id. Since the OCR claims to not require restriction on free speech beyond at state institu-
tions, this undermines any claim constitutional rights attach under the state action doctrine. It
might be open to argument a given settlement agreement with a private institution limits free
speech rights rises to the level of state action, given the state has condoned and authorized the
agreement.
135. According to Statista, in 2014 about 5.55 million students were enrolled in private col-
leges and 14.66 million in public colleges. The ratio of public to private colleges has increased
slightly over this time, with public colleges making up 67 percent of enrollments in 1965 and 72
percent in 2014. See Statista, U.S. college enrollment statistics for public and private colleges
from 1965 to 2016 and projections up to 2027 (in millions) (2018), https://www.statista.com/
statistics/183995/us-college-enrollment-and-projections-in-public-and-private-institutions/. When
it comes to law schools, the balance goes the other way. There are 85 ABA accredited public law
schools and 119 ABA accredited or provisionally accredited private law schools. See The Am. Bar
Ass’n, Private Law Schools (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/re
sources/aba_approved_law_schools/private_law_schools.html; see also The Am. Bar Ass’n, Pub-
lic Law Schools (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_ap
proved_law_schools/public_law_schools.html. In other words, only about 40 percent of law
schools are public while approximately 60 percent are private.
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First Amendment is not in the balance. Contractual agreements to protect
free speech might be in the balance, but the university generally dictates
those contractual obligations.136 Even when free speech is explicitly pro-
tected, it is limited by, or balanced against, the institution’s mission and
federal, state, and local laws that, among other things, protect against
discrimination.
Messages protecting free speech were largely lost on administrators
who understandably focused on the enforcement actions of the OCR and the
Department of Justice rather than the words of the “Dear Colleague” letters.
For instance, in its watershed enforcement decision against the University
of Montana, the OCR defined sexual harassment as “unwelcome conduct or
speech of a sexual nature, without regard to whether it creates a hostile
environment.”137 In other words, the university could be responsible for a
Title IX violation for sexual harassment that fell short of creating a hostile
environment. As the OCR stated, “Sexual harassment is unwelcome con-
duct of a sexual nature. When sexual harassment is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to deny or limit a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from
the school’s program based on sex, it creates a hostile environment.”138 The
Department of Justice used a similar definition in its April 22, 2016 letter
regarding allegations of sex discrimination at the University of New Mex-
ico, stating Title IX required defining sexual harassment as “unwelcome
conduct of a sexual nature,” including “verbal conduct,” “regardless of
whether it causes a hostile environment.”139
136. While these rights vis-a`-vis faculty are arguably negotiated, students do not get to negoti-
ate what is in their student handbook. While private institutions are not bound by the Constitution,
if they promise free speech rights in their recruiting materials, handbooks, and codes of conduct,
courts may find those institutions bound in contract to live up to those promises. See, e.g., Kelly
Sarabyn, Free Speech at Private Universities, 39 J. L. & EDUC. 145 (2010); Vurimindi v. Fuqua
Sch. of Bus., 435 Fed. Appx. 129, 273 (3rd Cir. 2011); Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410,
416 (7th Cir. 1992) (“It is held generally in the United States the ‘basic legal relation between a
student and a private university or college is contractual in nature. The catalogues, bulletins, circu-
lars, and regulations of the institution made available to the matriculant become a part of the
contract.’” (quoting Zumbrun v. Univ. of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 10 (1972))). See also Guiliani
v. Duke Univ., No. 1:08CV502, WL 1292321, at *7-8, (M.D. N.C. Mar. 30, 2010) (requiring the
incorporation of Duke’s handbooks and policy manuals into a separate contract as in an employ-
ment context); Love v. Duke Univ., 776 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (M.D. N.C. 1991) (academic bulletin
did not create binding contract between student and university). These cases involve students’
rights and not the rights of professors. As Guiliani implies, in the employment context, one would
need these to be actually incorporated into the contract. This is often the case with faculty hand-
books, which are incorporated by reference in faculty contracts.
137. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 9.
138. See letter from Anurima Bhargava, Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Gary Jackson, Re-
gional Director, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Royce Engstrom, President, and Lucy France, University
Counsel, Univ. of Montana (May 9, 2013) (on file with the Dep’t of Justice). This standard is
contrary to the decision in Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., which required conduct that was
both severe and pervasive. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
139. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 10 (citing letter from Shaheena Simons, Chief, and
Damon Martinez, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Robert G. Frank, President, Univ. of
New Mexico (Apr. 22, 2016) (on file with the Dep’t of Justice)).
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According to the AAUP Report, the 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter sig-
nificantly lowered the evidentiary standard from “clear and convincing”
(highly probable or reasonably certain) to a “preponderance of evi-
dence,”140 but this point is hotly contested and seems to divide the legal and
academic community. In addition to the AAUP, FIRE has challenged this
lower standard of proof, particularly in light of the fact that the accused
have very few procedural rights in campus hearings.141 However, nearly
one hundred law professors from over fifty different schools signed onto a
white paper defending OCR’s standard, in part on the basis that the prepon-
derance of evidence standard was used for racial discrimination and harass-
ment investigations on campus and schools had already been using the
standard for Title IX investigations prior to the 2011 “Dear Colleague” let-
ter.142 Seventy-nine members of the three hundred member group, FAR,
provided feedback critical of the draft AAUP Report and defended OCR’s
“preponderance of evidence” standard.143
The AAUP Report implies this lower standard has a disproportionate
impact on racial minorities and that Title IX enforcement initiatives may be
unwittingly perpetuating racial biases in the criminal justice system.144 Jen
Sorenson’s somewhat distasteful cartoon regarding the Stanford rape case
captures the problem graphically: the privileged white student athlete at
Stanford gets a “platinum pass” for rape; the poorly educated, athletically
challenged, white guy does not; and the male cartoon character with pig-
140. Id. at 10. They did so without notice and comment.
141. See Joe Cohn, Responding in Full to ‘Preponderance of the Evidence’ Advocates, FOUN-
DATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCATION (Oct. 18, 2012), https://www.thefire.org/respond
ing-in-full-to-preponderance-of-the-evidence-advocates/. There are also lawsuits challenging this
standard. See, e.g., Complaint, Doe v. Lhoman, No. 1:16-cv-01158 (D.D.C. June 16, 2016).
142. TITLE IX & THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE: A WHITE PAPER (2016), https://
assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3006873/Title-IX-Preponderance-White-Paper-Signed-8-7-
16.pdf [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. They argue it is the standard used by the DOE under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits race discrimination by educational institutions
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment,
including sexual harassment. Further, according to the WHITE PAPER, the available evidence
shows a majority of schools were already using the preponderance of evidence standard when the
2011 OCR letter was written, and they argue the OCR was using this standard in their investiga-
tions as far back as 1995. Id. at 8-10. While the 1975 regulations and subsequent guidelines did
not mandate an evidentiary standard, the guidelines required “ ‘prompt and equitable’ grievance
procedures for handling . . . internal complaints of sex discrimination.” Id. at 9. In a 1995 investi-
gation, they found the use of the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence was a factor in
determining the procedure was not equitable. Id. at 10.
143. This organization consists of faculty, students, and human rights activists. While they did
not take issue with the AAUP’s critical stance against the corporatization of universities nor the
AAUP Report’s criticism of designating most faculty as mandatory reporters, they noted the per-
sistent underreporting of rape on campuses by universities and were concerned that the AAUP
Report, “by pitting student concerns for campus safety against faculty interests, reinforce[d] the
symptoms instead of addresses the problem.” FAR, supra note 123. They pointed out a number of
what they considered to be factual and legal mistakes as well as selectivity and one-sidedness in
the AAUP Report’s depiction of cases. Id.
144. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 11.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 36  4-JAN-19 11:27
2018] FREE SPEECH ON THE LAW SCHOOL CAMPUS 61
ment in his skin “can get a harsh sentence just for being in the vicinity.”145
Of course, the problem here is not so much the standard of evidence in
harassment and sexual assault cases: it is racism. If racism is the problem,
then it is not clear that changing the evidentiary standard is the solution.
The AAUP Report quotes Harvard Professor Jeannie Suk (now Suk
Gersen), who challenged Harvard’s capitulation to the OCR standard of
preponderance of evidence.146 It should be noted that Suk Gersen’s concern
is not with the standard of proof in the abstract, but rather in the context of a
culture that shifted to granting immediate credibility to accusers without
affording the protections of due process for the accused. Suk Gersen states:
Sexual assault is a serious and insidious problem that occurs with
intolerable frequency on college campuses and elsewhere. Fight-
ing it entails, among other things, dismantling the historical bias
against victims, particularly black victims— and not simply re-
placing it with the tenet that an accuser must always and unthink-
ingly be fully believed. It is as important and logically necessary
to acknowledge the possibility of wrongful accusations of sexual
assault as it is to recognize that most rape claims are true. And if
we have learned from the public reckoning with the racial impact
of over-criminalization, mass incarceration, and law enforcement
bias, we should heed our legacy of bias against black men in rape
accusations. The dynamics of racially disproportionate impact af-
fect minority men in the pattern of campus sexual-misconduct ac-
cusations . . . . The “always believe” credo will aggravate and
hide this context, aided by campus confidentiality norms that
make any racial pattern difficult to study and expose. . . . We
should be attentive to our history and context, and be open to
believing, disbelieving, agreeing, or disagreeing, in individual in-
stances, based on evidence.147
The Massachusetts District Court, in the 2016 lawsuit against Brandeis
University, echoes Suk Gersen’s concerns. The Court noted:
Like Harvard, Brandeis appears to have substantially impaired, if
not eliminated, an accused student’s right to a fair and impartial
process. And it is not enough simply to say that such changes are
appropriate because victims of sexual assault have not always
achieved justice in the past. Whether someone is a “victim” is a
conclusion to be reached at the end of a fair process, not an as-
sumption to be made at the beginning. Each case must be decided
on its own merits, according to its own facts. If a college student
145. Jen Sorensen, Cartoon: Sexual Assault Platinum Pass, DAILY KOS, (June 21, 2016),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2016/06/21/1540835/-Cartoon-Sexual-assault-platinum-pass.
146. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 11. Note that while the AAUP Report references Profes-
sor Suk, she now goes by the name of Suk Gersen.
147. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 11 (quoting Jeannie Suk Gersen, Shutting Down Conver-
sations about Rape at Harvard Law, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2015) http://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/argument-sexual-assault-race-harvard-law-school).
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is to be marked for life as a sexual predator, it is reasonable to
require that he be provided a fair opportunity to defend himself
and an impartial arbiter to make that decision.148
The court held that lowering the standard in such cases was part of “an
effort to tilt the playing field against accused students, which is particularly
troublesome in light of the elimination of other basic rights of the
accused.”149
The OCR does not side with the AAUP in requiring the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard.150 Rather, the OCR allows institutions to “ap-
ply[ ] either a preponderance of the evidence standard or a clear and
convincing evidence standard” for its findings of fact and conclusions in
these investigations.151 Citing Doe v. Brandeis approvingly, the OCR does
require institutions to provide the same standard in sexual misconduct cases
as they apply in other student misconduct cases.152
148. See Doe v. Brandeis University, 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 573 (D. Mass. 2016) Because
Brandeis is a private university the court did not decide the case on the basis of constitutional due
process, but under the notion of basic procedural fairness for school disciplinary proceedings
under Massachusetts law. Id. at 602.
149. Id. at 607. Note the Court made clear that the problem was not the lower standard per se.
As it stated:
The selection of a lower standard (presumably, at the insistence of the United States
Department of Education) is not problematic, standing alone; that standard is commonly
used in civil proceedings, even to decide matters of great importance. Here, however,
the lowering of the standard appears to have been a deliberate choice by the university
to make cases of sexual misconduct easier to prove—and thus more difficult to defend,
both for guilty and innocent students alike. It retained the higher standard for virtually
all other forms of student misconduct.
Id. While Brandeis had retained its normal processes, for other matters of student discipline:
[B]y 2014, Brandeis’s policy in sexual misconduct cases had eliminated a hearing of
any kind. Instead, it had instituted a procedure under which a “Special Examiner” was
appointed to conduct an investigation and decide the “responsibility” of the accused.
That procedure was essentially a secret and inquisitorial process. Among other things,
under the new procedure,
• the accused was not entitled to know the details of the charges;
• the accused was not entitled to see the evidence;
• the accused was not entitled to counsel;
• the accused was not entitled to confront and cross-examine the accuser;
• the accused was not entitled to cross-examine any other witnesses;
• the Special Examiner prepared a detailed report, which the accused was not
permitted to see until the entire process had concluded; and
• the Special Examiner’s decision as to the “responsibility” (that is, guilt) of the
accused was essentially final, with limited appellate review—among other
things, the decision could not be overturned on the ground it was incorrect,
unfair, arbitrary, or unsupported by the evidence.
Id. at 570.
150. Dep’t of Educ. Office of Civil Rights, Q&A on Campus Sexual Misconduct 5 (Sept.
2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-title-ix-201709.pdf?utm_name.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 5. If schools are required to use the preponderance of evidence standard in race
based misconduct cases under Title VI, see WHITE PAPER, supra note 142, at 1, then oddly
enough, this might mean this is the required standard for all student misconduct cases, since they
must be the same.
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Again, the problem is not so much the shift in burden of proof to a
preponderance of evidence standard. That shift is really a change that levels
the scales of justice by asking whether the complainant or respondent has
the better case. The shift requires the complainant to convince the fact
finder that her or his factual contentions are more likely true than not true.
This is also the most common standard in civil cases. In contrast, the clear
and convincing standard, which arguably was used before by some univer-
sities, tilted the scales of justice in favor of the respondent (the alleged
perpetrator).153 The preponderance of evidence standard sends the message
that there are equal concerns on both sides of the equation; the clear and
convincing standard risks sending a message that an institution is not recep-
tive to claims.154
The problem lies not in this perceived evidentiary shift but rather in
what appears to be a whole host of other mechanisms that tilt the scales in
favor of a complainant. In the opinion of at least some, a cultural shift now
mandates one believe whatever an alleged victim claims, no matter the evi-
dence or how messy or complicated a situation may be.155 Sexual assault
and harassment cases involving students are often, if not always, compli-
cated. Most cases involve acquaintances ranging from study partners,
friends, or romantic relationships.156 Alcohol or drugs are sometimes in-
volved. Relationships are often in flux, not only day-to-day, but minute-to-
minute in some situations.157 One temptation in messy situations that call
for careful judgment is to fall back on dispositive tests: standards of proof
that answer the question for the decision maker. It is easier to hide behind a
clear and convincing proof standard, for it allows a decision maker to say,
“This was a close case with credible evidence on each side, and since it’s
hard to tell who has the better argument, we must decide that you have not
153. Note according to Deborah L. Brake the majority of universities and colleges were al-
ready using the preponderance of evidence standard before the 2011 Dear Colleague letter. Brake,
supra note 115, at 129.
154. Id. at 133. In tort law, it is common to adjust the burden of proof to a higher standard,
depending on the remedy being sought. Most commonly, the burden increases if the plaintiff is
seeking punitive damages. If the remedy sought, or the sanction to be imposed, is expulsion, there
may be an argument the higher standard is warranted given its punitive nature. Most sanctions
short of expulsion arguably have either a compensatory or restorative/educational function and
should not require the higher standard.
155. See Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforcement, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 103, 114 (2015).
156. According to the National Institute of Justice, of the U.S. Department of Justice, “[a]bout
85 to 90 percent of sexual assaults reported by college women are perpetrated by someone known
to the victim.” Most Victims Know Their Attacker, Nat’l Inst. Of Just., https://www.nij.gov/topics/
crime/rape-sexual-violence/campus/Pages/know-attacker.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
157. Professor Shaw, the former Title IX officer at the University of Dayton, documents the
“hook-up” culture on campus, binge drinking on campus and how the combination complicates
the unwanted sex that often results. Lori E. Shaw, Title IX, Sexual Assault, and the Issue of
Effective Consent: Blurred Lines—When Should “Yes” Mean “No”?, 91 INDIANA L. J. 1363,
1423 (2016). Unwanted sex always carries the risk of serious emotional harm, even if it does not
rise to the level of a sexual assault or rape. Id. at 1391.
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met this higher burden.” As Deborah L. Brake argues, “The risk that a clear
and convincing evidence standard would impose insurmountable proof re-
quirements is heightened by the incentives for universities to find accused
students not responsible.”158 It is harder to avoid responsibility for one’s
judgment call when the standard is preponderance of evidence. While vic-
tims were silenced or largely ignored on many campuses under the clear
and convincing standard and an unhealthy set of campus cultural norms
(e.g. “the rape culture”), it does not follow that embracing the preponder-
ance standard means every claim of sexual misconduct is valid or will be
successful. The standard does not imply a presumption of guilt. It is not the
case that anyone who perceives a harm or feels like they are a victim is, in
fact, a victim. Further, it does not follow that there is always a guilty perpe-
trator or aggressor responsible for that harm, whether it be real or perceived.
Sometimes we are equally at fault, sometimes one is more at fault, and
sometimes we simply misperceive or misinterpret each other—especially
when it comes to speech and other forms of expressive conduct related to
sex.159 Messy situations that call for careful judgment are not alien to legal
158. Brake, supra note 115, at 132. The Supreme Court tends to take shortcuts with its use of
tests in both the equal protection and free speech arena. While former Justices O’Connor and
Marshall argued strict scrutiny should not be fatal in fact (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (Justice O’Connor quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring)), and Justice Stevens argued there was only one equal protection clause
analysis, a substantive reasonableness analysis requires balancing (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
211–12 (1976) (Stevens J., concurring)), others like Justice Scalia preferred to place cases in
either the strict scrutiny or rational basis buckets, because those buckets diminished the Court’s
discretion and made it much easier to decide the cases. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law
of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179-80 (1989). Strict would be fatal, while rational basis was
feeble. In the arena of the First Amendment, the Court, over the past few years has declined the
invitation to balance the value of certain types of speech against the harm caused by speech and
applied strict scrutiny in cases involving legislation designed to ban animal cruelty videos, the sale
of violent video games to children, and falsely claiming to have been awarded the Congressional
Medal of Honor. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010); Brown v. Entm’t Merchants
Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786 (2011); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). In these cases, Gun-
ther’s adage appears to be correct, the scrutiny is “ ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
159. See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10 (discussing emotional reasoning). From a personal-
responsibility perspective, I am a fan of “yes means yes” rather than merely “no means no.” I am
also fully aware there are many ways of saying yes, short of the signed waiver and that, for a
multitude of reasons, people rarely communicate clearly in these matters. As Professor Shaw
notes, society does not agree on what kind of behavior “unambiguously” signals a willingness to
engage in sexual conduct. Shaw, supra note 157, at 1412. Professor Shaw describes the results of
a 2015 Washington Post and the Kaiser Family Foundation poll of students regarding non-verbal
cues might signal consent: “When asked if undressing, getting a condom, and/or nodding in agree-
ment established consent for further sexual activity, over forty percent said ‘yes’ and over forty
percent said ‘no.’ “ Id. Professor Shaw argues for a “No means No” standard, based in part on the
fact it stakes out a middle ground between jurisdiction where “No” is insufficient to establish
criminal liability for sexual assault and the “Yes means Yes” approach as found on many cam-
puses, in part because of the many practical problems of determining if a person has evidenced
consent through non-verbal cues, and in part because women surveyed generally prefer the “No
means No” standard to a “Yes means Yes” standard. Id. at 1409-11, 1413-14.
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culture; they are the grist for legal education. Law schools and their admin-
istrators should be able to handle them.160
C. Mandatory Reporters All
Requiring all faculty to be Title IX mandatory reporters is another ex-
ample where university administrators have come to err on the side of
overcompliance. This overcompliance has the potential to chill speech be-
tween faculty and students, both inside and outside the classroom. The
AAUP Report notes that although Title IX does not require every faculty
member be a mandatory reporter, administrators have tended to implement
policies requiring just that.161 This tendency is due in part to the OCR’s
compliance agreement with the University of Montana, which required
mandatory reporting for “all employees who are aware of sex-based harass-
ment, except health-care professionals and any other individuals who are
statutorily prohibited from reporting.”162 This somewhat prophylactic re-
quirement was based on past failures of the University of Montana to take
sexual harassment seriously.163
As the AAUP Report notes, “Such an overly broad definition of
faculty members as mandatory reporters, adopted by universities without
consultation with the faculty, disregards compelling educational reasons to
respect the confidentiality of students who have sought faculty advice or
160. Although Professor Shaw does not address sexual harassment, she does an excellent job
addressing the complexities of unwanted sexual contact on campus in her article Title IX, Sexual
Assault, and the Issue of Effective Consent: Blurred Lines – When Should “Yes” Mean “No”?
supra note 157. She not only documents the complexities of unwanted sex on campus given the
culture of drinking and hooking up, but she also illustrates these complexities with a scenario
involving two students who engaged in sex after consuming alcohol. Id. at 1372-78. She describes
the scenario from the perspective of the two students involved, from witnesses at the party where
they met and from video surveillance at the dorm. Id. The situation is complicated and would be a
difficult call for any Title IX coordinator. Shaw provides a detailed and well supported proposal
for addressing these kinds of cases that is not only sensitive to each party involved, but is in-
formed by an understanding of the dynamics of drinking and sex on campus. Id. at 1421-22.
Through this lens, what was originally very fuzzy and complicated is much clearer and easier to
resolve.
161. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 16.
162. Id. The OCR also stated that the Montana agreement would serve as a blueprint for other
institutions. Id. at 16.
163. As predicted by the AAUP Report, in the Spring of 2015, Florida Coastal School of Law
sent an email to the faculty requiring it to include language in all syllabi giving notice to students
that faculty cannot keep information about sexual misconduct/violence confidential, and that if
you share information with them, they must report this information immediately to the Title IX
Coordinator. The faculty training video on Title IX was sent out on November 10, 2015, and the
statement for inclusion in our syllabi was sent out on November 11, 2015. Although some faculty
urged reconsideration, the administration’s response, in part, was that the faculty did not have
attorney-client privileges with students, so nothing in the law or a law faculty member’s legal
ethical duties barred being a mandatory reporter. While some professors raised educational ethics
issues with the idea, including student safety and support, these too went unheeded.
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counsel.”164 The AAUP Report notes this will cause a chilling effect in
classrooms and stifle discussion that might have led a student to disclosing
something in the course of the learning process.165 The AAUP Report ar-
gues such a broad definition perpetuates double standards and dispropor-
tionately burdens women and LGBTQ faculty who otherwise may be—or
appear to be—more responsive, affected, and invested in Title IX’s educa-
tional objectives.166 In other words, it negatively impacts the goals of Title
IX itself by chilling the speech and interactions of allies to the cause. As the
AAUP Report concludes, “If many students view faculty members as ‘first
responders’ in their advising and pedagogical capacities, they should be ex-
plicitly classified by institutional policies as ‘confidential’ rather than
‘mandatory’ reporters.”167
This issue is complicated. Dr. Tammy Hodo has raised a number of
valid concerns with the idea that faculty members be counted as “confiden-
tial” as opposed to “mandatory reporters.” Her concerns include:
• Having the tool-kit necessary to truly assist the reporting student;
• Having the investigative skills to ask the appropriate questions
when gathering information;
• Being equipped to provide students with community resources to
address sexual assault, domestic violence, etc.;
• Having the training in trauma-informed techniques to ensure a re-
porting party is not re-traumatized;
• Being able to ensure confidentiality and avoid bias, particularly if a
faculty member knows both students.168
As Dr. Hodo noted, “These are the types of questions that need to be an-
swered when we think about Title IX.”169 Without these tools and skills, the
faculty member is not equipped to responsibly act as a confidential re-
source. Rather, the faculty member should either refer the student to such a
resource or inform the student that the member has a duty to report what the
student divulges. Dr. Hodo did not imply these concerns applied to all
faculty or in all situations, as some faculty members do have the relevant
skills, knowledge, and resources to alleviate these concerns. Nonetheless,
many do not. These concerns are at their highest strength if faculty are
taking over Title IX duties. The concerns could be significantly diminished
164. Id. at 16 (citing Colleen Flaherty, Endangering a Trust, INSIDE HIGHER ED, (Feb. 4,
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/02/04/faculty-members-object-new-policies-
making-all-professors-mandatory-reporters-sexual).
165. Id.
166. Id. There are, of course, some male faculty who teach and write in these areas and/or who
are clearly approachable.
167. Id. This point was raised in particular by some of the clinical faculty at the law school
whose interactions with clients and students often bring up related issues.
168. E-mail from Dr. Tammy Hodo, Ph.D., Florida Coastal School of Law Title IX Compli-
ance Officer, to author (July 8, 2016) (on file with author).
169. Id.
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if training and resources are provided to faculty along with guidance on
confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and, perhaps, the duty to report under
certain conditions.170 Some faculty may embrace this training and the re-
sponsibilities that go with it, while some may shudder at the idea and want
nothing to do with it.171
The simplistic solution from the administration’s perspective is to take
it all out of the hands of faculty and put it in the hands of a single person or
office. This would appear to get rid of most, if not all, of the aforemen-
tioned concerns.172 The problem is that in some cases there will be no way
to avoid some of these responsibilities. If a student happens to break down
in front of a professor and triggers something that would require mandatory
reporting, the cat is out of the proverbial bag and cannot be easily put back
in without a scratch. Does one continue to listen attentively until the student
finishes before reminding the student, “I am mandated to report this to the
Title IX coordinator,” or does one interrupt the student at the first hint,
effectively turning a deaf ear? Which is more or less likely to re-traumatize
or damage what bond there was that made the student feel safe enough to
disclose the information in the first place? In either case, the speech be-
tween student and faculty member is chilled.
From the faculty-member perspective, the best way to avoid this is to
be the classic kind of law professor: not approachable. This, however, is not
the trend. Many law schools expect professors to be both effective teachers
and mentors who students will seek out for help and guidance. The more we
embody these values (which are somewhat consistent with the student-as-
customer model) the more we risk having to betray this implied trust. Law
professors generally have the background and skills to take on this training
and responsibility, should they desire to. Perhaps those faculty who are
willing and able to take on the training and responsibility of being a confi-
dential resource (as opposed to mandatory reporters) should be treated as
such.
170. Suppose a student reports to her or his professor “discomfort” with a student within a
professor’s class and the student wants the professor to do something, such as sanction the student,
move them to the other end of the classroom, or move them to another section the professor might
be teaching, but the student does not want to involve the administration or the Title IX officer.
This, in my opinion, is not a situation the professor should handle alone. If the student wishes to
take it further, it should be taken up with the administration. What if, however, the student does
not want to take it further and would rather have nothing done than have it reported to the admin-
istration? Is the “discomfort” enough to trigger mandatory reporting?
171. We faculty sometimes complain about not enough shared governance, but we also com-
plain about more committee work, training, and responsibilities.
172. Note at least one senior administrator reported to me she was not aware there was a
choice about having all faculty be mandatory reporters.
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D. Trigger Warnings: Avoiding or Engaging
“Trigger warnings” are warnings given by a professor to the class that
upcoming material may trigger uncomfortable or painful emotional re-
sponses. While trigger warnings can be a form of coddling by allowing
students to avoid things they should confront, this does not need to be the
case. Further, the outright dismissal of trigger warnings fails to engage the
educational obstacles some material or topics create.173
Unsurprisingly, the AAUP Report is highly critical of calls for trigger
warnings and draws from its previous report on the issue from 2014 (the
2014 Report).174 In the 2014 Report, the AAUP concluded:
The presumption that students need to be protected rather than
challenged in a classroom is at once infantilizing and anti-intel-
lectual. It makes comfort a higher priority than intellectual en-
gagement . . . it singles out politically controversial topics like
sex, race, class, capitalism, and colonialism for attention. Indeed,
if such topics are associated with triggers, correctly or not, they
are likely to be marginalized if not avoided altogether by faculty
who fear complaints for offending or discomforting some of their
students. . . In this way the demand for trigger warnings creates a
repressive, “chilly climate” for critical thinking in the
classroom.175
The 2014 Report also concluded that focusing on trigger warnings was
a way of displacing the problem of sexual violence on campus. As it stated,
“Trigger warnings will not solve this problem, but only misdirect attention
from it and, in the process, threaten the academic freedom of teachers and
students whose classrooms should be open to difficult discussions,
whatever form they take.”176
173. While the authors of the AAUP Report leave it up to professors to decide on trigger
warnings, Lukianoff and Haidt recommend that, “[u]niversities should also officially and strongly
discourage trigger warnings.” Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10. Goldberg also considers it a
violation of academic freedom and free speech rights for a university to impose trigger warnings
on professors. Goldberg, supra note 28, at 749.
174. See AAUP, On Trigger Warnings (Aug. 2014), http://www.aaup.org/report/trigger-
warnings.
175. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 15. They also noted “[a]lthough all faculty are affected by
potential charges of this kind, non-tenured and contingent faculty are particularly at risk.” This is
linked to the corporatization of education, cost cutting, profit increasing links into a reduction of
tenured and tenure track faculty, and an increase of faculty who are less expensive, have less say
and are more fungible.
176. Id. While the AAUP Report would leave it in the hands of individual faculty members to
provide such warnings in class, it was concerned about putting trigger warnings in syllabi, even if
used willingly. As predicted by the AAUP Report, Florida Coastal’s Title IX Compliance Officer,
Dr. Hodo, gave the faculty a short lecture on trigger warnings in the Spring of 2016, asking us to
flag potentially unsettling content and to allow students to leave or take a moment if they needed
to in classes where the content may trigger an emotional response. A number of faculty com-
mented on the fact that students wishing to be lawyers need to be able to face difficult subjects.
The officer appropriately, in my opinion, noted sometimes when emotions are triggered, the stu-
dent’s learning may in fact be impaired.
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This takes the point too far. While there is nothing wrong with being
attentive to the negative impact of trigger warnings, they do not exclude
addressing the problems of sexual violence on campus, nor do they require
the avoidance of difficult topics. One can be sensitive to the impact of cer-
tain topics and still take on the responsibility of addressing them in a pro-
fessional manner. The options are not callous disregard for people’s
sensitivities or complete avoidance. Middle ground may be slightly more
difficult but should not be avoided. As my colleague Professor Quince Hop-
kins points out, there is a distinction to be made between a “warning” and
the options for responding to the warning.177 The purpose of the warning
might be to allow a student to gird their emotional/psychological loins in
advance of the discussion. For instance, Professor Hopkins provides a trig-
ger warning about dated language (“colored” and “negro”) in the Loving v.
Virginia news clips before she shows them in class.178 As she put it, the
point is not to avoid the topic but rather to put enough of a blanket around
the language so that students’ learning is not impaired.179
In some classes, like constitutional law or family law, one could spend
a considerable amount of time giving trigger warnings. Numerous courses
and topics in law school can trigger painful emotional responses, be it crim-
inal law, criminal procedure, family law, or even property law and bank-
ruptcy law for those who suffered serious loss in the recent financial
crisis.180 Discussions regarding military conflicts or the “war on terror”
may be triggers for those returning from our continued conflicts abroad.
There may be a chilling effect on classes if one needs to constantly
police topics and discussions for subjects that might offend students’ sensi-
bilities. Sensitive topics are nearly impossible to avoid in certain areas. If
the administration signals caution or avoidance rooted in Title IX fears,
professors might avoid or downplay sensitive areas, seriously undermining
critical engagement with controversial topics core to the law and social jus-
tice. If we avoid or sugar coat these issues in the law school environment—
where they should be dealt with in a professional manner—how do we ex-
pect students to cope with these issues when they arise in practice?
For example, there is a concern that some professors may avoid teach-
ing sexual assault and rape in criminal law courses.181 The irony, as pointed
out in the AAUP Report, is that feminists fought to have this topic included
in the curriculum only to now find it is being excluded for being too emo-
177. Interview with Quince Hopkins, Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law (n.d.).
178. Id.
179. Id. I started giving a trigger warning in the Fall of 2017 and have never had a student
leave class on account of the warning.
180. More specialized courses such as international criminal law, gender and the law, sexual-
ity and the law, poverty law, and many of the clinics may trigger strong emotional responses.
181. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 15.
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tionally sensitive.182 Further, discussions looking at the intersection of sex-
ual assault, race, and class are sometimes viewed as insensitive to victims.
Thus, these discussions are viewed not only as triggers but also as creating
a hostile environment.183 As a result, very important (if not necessary) dis-
cussions related to the realities of sexual assault cases are sometimes
avoided.
My guess is most criminal law professors do not avoid the topic. None
of the three professors who regularly teach criminal law at Florida Coastal
School of Law avoid the topic, and neither do I when I occasionally teach
the course.184 All of us think the topic is too important to avoid. None of us
mention trigger warnings in our syllabi, but one of us offers that students
who feel they cannot be present for this material may use one of their ab-
sences with no questions asked. Another professor does this when address-
ing domestic violence, since there is no way to address the material without
talking about sexual assault. We all advise the class about the need for pro-
fessionalism and decorum when discussing sensitive issues.185
Faculty report mixed stories about students who have actually had
painful emotions triggered. Although one professor noted one of her stu-
dents became very upset during a discussion of battered women’s syn-
drome, she believed the student appreciated the topic was discussed.
Another professor noted a veteran became upset after watching a video on
the defense of duress that involved following unlawful orders. The profes-
sor used this as a teaching moment about the topics that will come up in
practice and the need to be able to face such topics as a lawyer.
While some faculty may welcome training and the growth opportunity
that comes with a deeper engagement with aspects of law that may trigger
traumatic emotional responses,186 some may see this entire area as outside
182. Id. at 15 (citing Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Trouble with Teaching Rape Law, NEW
YORKER  (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trouble-teaching-rape-
law).
183. Id. at 15–16. The AAUP Report cites and quotes the work of Jeannie Suk Gersen, supra
note 182. Suk Gersen begins her article by asking the reader to “[i]magine a medical student who
is training to be a surgeon but who fears he’ll become distressed if he sees or handles blood.” See
also Jeannie Suk Gersen, Shutting Down Conversations about Rape at Harvard Law, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/argument-sexual-assault-
race-harvard-law-school.
184. My Criminal Law students from the Fall of 2007 presented me with an award for the
professor with the most students seeking mental health counseling after the midterm exam. This
was not exactly what I was hoping for.
185. While panelist at SEALS did not avoid teaching the topic, one panelist does not test on
the topic because of a fear that under the pressure of an exam, the topic could undermine a
student’s performance.
186. It is not always clear that the emotional response is actually dysfunctional. It is how those
emotions are dealt with that are either functional or dysfunctional. Simple avoidance is not func-
tional. See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10; see also Interview with Greg Lukianoff, Sensitivity
or Censorship: How Language Policing on College Campuses is Shaping America’s Future, TO
THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE (July 23, 2017), http://www.ttbook.org/book/sensitivity-or-censor
ship-how-language-policing-college-campuses-shaping-americas-future.
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their expertise and comfort zone. The latter professors may try to avoid
triggering topics altogether or simply close their eyes and ears to the emo-
tional harm and damage they may be causing. If “trigger warnings” and the
subjects that trigger them are viewed as landmines, rather than as parts of a
healthy dialogue, both will be avoided.
Avoidance diminishes both free speech and important educational op-
portunities. Avoiding these subjects would be a disservice to the entire edu-
cational enterprise. As Professor Suk Gersen states in her Atlantic article:
Now more than ever, it is critical that law students develop the
ability to engage productively and analytically in conversations
about assault. Instead, though, many students and teachers appear
to be absorbing a cultural signal that real and challenging discus-
sion of sexual misconduct is too risky to undertake—and that the
risk is of a traumatic injury analogous to sexual assault itself.187
Professors need to be concerned with more than merely the potential
threat of students running to administration to complain about language. As
Nicki Monahan points out in an article written in the wake of the recent
Orlando night club attack, we not only need to be concerned about po-
larized discussions in class, we need to be concerned about polarized stu-
dents coming to class with concealed weapons.188 Monahan notes it might
be time to admit that “safe classrooms” are an illusion.189 We need to ac-
knowledge that what is needed are brave spaces and courageous conversa-
tions.190 As Monahan explains, “Brave classrooms are places where
students and faculty openly share their different perspectives and life exper-
iences for the purpose of learning, fully aware that there is risk involved in
doing so.”191 For those of us teaching constitutional law during this new
presidential administration, the risks are palpable.192 And adding the fact
that law school is not always the best environment for mental health creates
187. See Suk Gersen, supra note 182.
188. See Nicki Monahan, Brave Classrooms and Courageous Conversations (July 6, 2016),
http://www.facultyfocus.com/articles/teaching-and-learning/brave-classrooms-courageous-conver
sations/.
189. As she notes, “Safe spaces have been defined as an ‘environment in which students are
willing and able to participate and honestly struggle with challenging issues.’” Id. (quoting Holley
& Steiner, Safe Space: Student Perspectives on Classroom Environment, 41 J. SOC. WORK EDUC.
49–64 (2005)).
190. Id. (citing B. Arao & K. Clemens, Safe Spaces to Brave Spaces: A New Way to Frame
Dialogue Around Diversity and Social Justice, in THE ART OF EFFECTIVE FACILITATION (Lisa
Landreman ed., 2013)).
191. Id.
192. 2016 appeared considerably less risky, but one student called me a racist on my Constitu-
tional Law I student evaluation, with no explanation. From what I could gather from students in
my Constitutional Law II class, it was from a class where I was critical of President Obama’s use
of predator drones on a U.S. citizen. I was also critical of former President Bush in class, so I was
a little surprised by the comment.
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particular cause for concern.193 In a course like constitutional law, it is im-
possible to avoid discussion of the Trump administration’s views on, and
policies related to, immigration, LGBTQA communities, certain religious
groups, women, racial and ethnic minorities, Supreme Court appointments,
and the president’s powers as commander-in-chief.
Avoidance is futile, particularly in law school classes, and is also edu-
cationally unsound. Callously disregarding the thoughts and feelings of sup-
porters of President Trump, Secretary Clinton, or Bernie Sanders is not wise
either; doing so threatens to further polarize students and either will shut
them down or bring out emotional responses that are, at best, a threat to the
learning process and at worse, a true threat to the safety of students and
professors alike. For instance, if the goal is to have students engaged and
learning about the potential impact of this last election on the future of the
law, we must find a way to bravely and responsibly engage them on these
issues. Monahan explains:
[L]earning does not take place when our firmly held beliefs are
never challenged. It is the hallmark of a robust education that stu-
dents graduate having been exposed to new ideas, differing per-
spectives, and challenging ways of thinking. This process can and
should be difficult, messy, and certainly uncomfortable. In aca-
demic terms, it is when we are at the edge of discomfort that
learning truly happens.194
Learning also does not take place when students are emotionally dis-
traught or filled with anger and rage. Trigger warnings should not be a
shield to avoid these difficult topics but rather a tool for navigating them.
Healthy discussions are not competitions for pushing each other’s buttons,
riling up the masses, or talking past each other. This is rarely (if ever) ap-
propriate in any classroom, let alone a law school classroom.
A good argument in a law school classroom, in a moot court brief, in a
legal memo, or in front of a judge does not ignore or reduce the opposing
view to a straw person. Rather, it takes the opposing view’s strong points
and one’s own weak points seriously. To be effective advocates, lawyers
need to be able to confront difficult issues, appreciate what may trigger
their own emotions and the emotions of others, and move beyond their own
perspective and emotional response. Lawyers need to engage with an argu-
193. According to the A.B.A. Mental Health and Substance Abuse Toolkit for Law School
Students and Those Who Care About Them, “While students enter law school suffering from
clinical stress and depression at a rate that mirrors the national average, the rate sharply increases
during the first year of law school. Through the duration of their legal education, the rates of law
students grappling with substance abuse and mental health problems increase dramatically.”
A.B.A. Law Student Division, A.B.A. Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs & Dave Nee
Foundation, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Toolkit for Law School Students and Those Who
Care About Them (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/lawyer_as
sistance/ls_colap_mental_health_toolkit_new.authcheckdam.pdf.
194. Id.
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ment if they want to not only advocate but also persuade. This is not a new
insight. Law schools have always put a premium on reasoned arguments
backed by evidence and authority and have discounted ad hominin attacks
and emotional arguments.
E. Disconnected from Faculty Governance: Input, Debate, and Buy-In
The AAUP Report details numerous cases that cut across teaching,
research, and extramural speech.195 The cases are shocking—not because of
the behavior of the professor in question, but because administrators over-
reacted without first seeking input from faculty.196 As the AAUP Report
authors note, “Rather than use mechanisms of faculty governance to care-
fully construct institutional measures to address problems of sexual harass-
ment and sexual misconduct, university administrations have implemented
hastily created procedures in an effort to conform to the OCR’s interpreta-
tion of Title IX requirements.”197 Title IX administrators often lack faculty
standing and are “insulated from faculty members, students, and existing
shared governance mechanisms.”198 Accordingly, Title IX policies are not
always the result of an engaged process where one would expect input,
debate, and buy-in. Rather, these policies are generally announced in emails
or at faculty meetings with no, or little, prior discussion.199 Here, I concur
with the AAUP Report that more speech in the form of input and debate
would not only result in better policies, but also better buy-in to those
policies.
F. Title IX in the Context of the “Corporate” University
The AAUP Report’s authors define the corporate university as a new
organizational model that is entrepreneurial, focuses more on vocational
training than humanistic learning, privileges administrative and managerial
195. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 19-21. The AAUP Report also notes the importance of
faculty governance to due process concerns, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
196. Cf. Michael H. LeRoy, How Courts View Academic Freedom, 42 J.C. & U.L. 1 (2016)
(analyzing the results of 339 First Amendment decisions regarding academic freedom from 1964
through 2014, in which schools won 73 percent of the rulings, and noting schools’ success was
partially due to the schools not taking extreme measures, such as firing, the colleges and universi-
ties rarely interfered with “the expression of objectionable and controversial ideas”, and some
faculty members made “mountains out of molehills” in their complaints. Id. at 40-42.). Thus, we
might want to be cautious about making too much of the horror stories told on the side of faculty.
Administrators also have their horror stories.
197. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 19.
198. Id.
199. See id. It should be noted, however, Florida Coastal’s Title IX coordinator was just hired
in 2015 and while her position as a non-faculty member made shared governance institutionally
challenging, she was not closed off to faculty and student input. Previous administrators in her
position have been a part of the multicultural committee, which has consisted of faculty, staff, and
students. In the past, Florida Coastal had a Dean of Multiculturalism who took on many of the
duties exercised by Dr. Hodo. The role of Title IX coordinator has only recently come to the fore.
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methods and interests, evaluates departments and disciplines in terms of
business metrics of economic efficiency, and sees students as consumers
whose satisfaction is paramount.200 This new model has ascended in part
due to the reductions in state and federal support for higher education.201
Both public and private law schools were treated as profit centers for other
parts of their universities until the recent crisis in law school enrollment
across the country.202 Thus, the risks associated with this model are in no
way unique to the “for profit” law schools, although they may be exacer-
bated by the explicit corporate structure.
The AAUP Report’s treatment of the corporate university begins by
noting the danger of overemphasizing compliance with Title IX objectives.
It notes there is a serious risk of exacerbating gender, racial, and other in-
justices.203 At first, it is unclear what this has to do with the “corporate”
university, but as the Report goes on, it is clear that the problem is that
universities have taken a too narrow focus on isolated administrative
processes rather than a big picture analysis of a problem that overlaps with
other areas of discrimination, inequality, and educational goals.204 As the
AAUP Report states, “[C]ollege and university efforts to comply with Title
IX have followed the trail blazed by departments of human resources,
where the establishment of reporting protocols and internal processes can
200. Id. at 21-22.
201. Id. at 21. As the authors define it:
That phrase refers to a new organizational model of university management and govern-
ance that is entrepreneurial at its core. In part as a result of reductions in state and
federal support for higher education, the model also reflects a vast cultural change in
thinking about the value and function of higher education, one that is oriented more
toward vocational training than toward humanistic learning. The entrepreneurial model
privileges administrative managerial methods and interests; evaluates and reduces or
eliminates departments and disciplines according to borrowed business metrics of eco-
nomic efficiency; and promotes a commercial model of higher education, in which stu-
dent satisfaction as “education consumers” is paramount.
Id.
202. This is true of public institutions, non-profit institutions, as well as for-profit universities.
Evidence of this fact can be found in a piece by David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game? N.Y.
TIMES, (Jan. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?_r=0. It can also
be found in the resignation letter of the University of Baltimore Dean, Elie Mystal, A Resigning
Law Dean Spills the Beans on the Fleecing of Students, ABOVE THE LAW, (July 29, 2011), http://
abovethelaw.com/2011/07/a-law-dean-resigns-and-spills-the-beans-on-how-his-university-has-
been-taking-advantage-of-law-students/. As reported in the Wall Street Journal blog, the Univer-
sity of Baltimore took about forty-five percent of the law school’s revenue in 2010. See Nathan
Koppel, One Law School Dean’s Noisy Withdrawal, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (July 29, 2011), http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/07/29/one-law-school-deans-noisy-withdrawal/. This partially explains
why law school tuition was still rising in 2012 while demand was falling. This, my guess, is
because universities wanted to maintain the revenue they had come to expect from law schools
and to do this, the fewer numbers of students would need to pay more. See Karen Sloan, Tuition is
Still Growing. Despite Lagging Law School Applications, It Vastly Exceeds Inflation, THE NAT’L
L.J. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202567898209?id=1202567898209
&Tuition_is_still_growing&slreturn=20160603122958.
203. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 21.
204. Id. at 22-23.
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take precedence over holistic challenges to prevailing gender and sexual
norms.”205
The AAUP Report notes while “Title IX compliance is in the hands of
administrators, . . . the courses that might address structures of discrimina-
tion and inequality are often marginalized and underfunded.”206 The rea-
sons stated in the AAUP Report have to do with external research funding
and employment statistics.207 At law schools—particularly lower tier
schools that have had enrollment and bar pass challenges—outcomes-based
metrics on bar passage, gainful employments statistics,208 and simply the
lower number of students209 have resulted in fewer of these kinds of elec-
tives and a narrower focus on black-letter law in courses that are bar tested.
It is easier to avoid all Title IX triggers if one sticks to bar-tested, multiple-
choice questions.210 For instance, less than a decade ago Florida Coastal’s
faculty were strongly encouraged to infuse multicultural materials into all
of our courses.211 However, over the last half decade, this emphasis has
faded: now the emphasis fluctuates between bar readiness and practice read-
iness. This is consistent with the corporate model of shifting towards voca-
tional training with less focus on the humanities.212
The authors also note this model tends to put the emphasis on “bureau-
cratic and legalistic methods” of compliance rather than addressing the big
picture of bias and discrimination across race, gender, sexual orientation,
and gender identity.213 They warn this emphasis may in fact exacerbate bias
205. Id. at 22.
206. Id. at 21.
207. Id.
208. For profit law schools are also faced with threats from DOE regulations regarding gainful
employment non-profit and state schools are exempt from.
209. According to the New York Times, by 2014, “[e]nrollment numbers of first-year law
students . . . sunk to levels not seen since 1973, when there were 53 fewer law schools in the
United States, according to the figures just released by the American Bar Association. The 37,924
full- and part-time students who started classes in 2014 represent a 30 percent decline from just
four years ago, when enrollment peaked at 52,488.” Elizabeth Olson & David Segal, A Steep Slide
in Law School Enrollment Accelerates, N.Y. TIMES,  (Dec. 17, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2014/12/17/law-school-enrollment-falls-to-lowest-level-since-1987/?_r=0. In 2015, the num-
bers fell a further 4.9 percent for J.D. admissions. See A.B.A. Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar, 2015 Standard 509 Information Report Data Now Available, n.d., http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_
bar/governancedocuments/2015_fall_enrollment_announcement.authcheckdam.pdf.
210. Note professors have also been encouraged to be aware of triggers in multiple choice
question stems.
211. This was consistent with Florida Coastal’s mission to serve the underserved. The mul-
ticulturalism committee worked for several years to create materials that could be used in a num-
ber of core curriculum courses. Those materials were last updated in 2010-2011. Although there
was an update of the file folder system in 2013, the otherwise well-organized folders are largely
empty.
212. See discussion supra Section V.F.
213. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 23. As pointed out in the WHITE PAPER, “Research con-
firms violating Title IX by mishandling sexual violence cases has been quite expensive for schools
for quite some time, and such violations are getting more expensive for schools, not less.” WHITE
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and discrimination by perpetuating a narrow view of gender identity.214 As
the authors conclude on this point, “This approach fails to respond to the
overarching question: What vision of justice, educational access, and public
accountability should the enforcement of Title IX seek to facilitate?”215
The problems for free speech and faculty input are compounded under
the corporate model due in part to the reduction in tenure track faculty.216
Non-tenure track faculty tend to be paid less to teach more, and are more
easily replaced. This is not merely a phenomenon at for-profit institutions,
but has been occurring nationwide, and, from the perspective of Title IX,
the impact falls disproportionately on female faculty. According to the
AAUP Report, “More than half of all female faculty now hold part-time
positions and more than 45 percent of full-time female faculty have non-
tenure-track appointments.”217 Faculty with less security of tenure are more
risk averse, and this may lead to avoiding these sensitive topics.218
VI. WHY HAVEN’T LAW SCHOOLS AND THEIR ASSOCIATIONS
PUSHED BACK?
If free speech is to be found anywhere on a university campus, one
would expect it at the law school. Further, one would expect law professors
to be the first to push back on any encroachments on academic freedom,
input into faculty governance, or freedom of speech in their classrooms and
scholarship. If laws or regulations are being erroneously interpreted so as to
trample on these freedoms, one would expect law professors, law schools,
and their associations to be the first to champion restraint and push for more
PAPER, supra note 142, at 11. See also United Educators, Confronting Campus Sexual Assault: An
Examination of Higher Education Claims, EDURISK 14 (2015), http://www.ncdsv.org/
ERS_Confronting-Campus-Sexual-Assault_2015.pdf; Dana Bolger, Gender Violence Costs:
Schools’ Financial Obligations Under Title IX, 125 YALE L.J. 2106 (2016).
214. Id. at 24 (citing Halley, supra note 155).
215. Id. at 23-24.
216. For instance, using federal government data, the AAUP found the percentage of full-time
tenured faculty fell 8 percent from 1975 to 2011, whereas full-time non-tenure track faculty rose 6
percent, and part-time faculty rose nearly 17 percent, during the same time. Indeed, Kezar and
Sam note many universities “have been dismantling the system of tenure through the majority of
new appointments are not tenure protected.” Adrianna Kezar & Cecile Sam, Understanding Non-
Tenure Track Faculty: New Assumptions and Theories for Conceptualizing Behavior, 55 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1419, 1422 (2011). The American Federation of Teachers notes nearly three-
fourths of instructional positions in higher education, including graduate assistants, are not tenure
eligible. Even if graduate employees are not considered, over half of teachers in universities are
not in tenure-track positions. See Higher Education Data Center, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
TEACHERS, https://www.aft.org/higher-education-data-center (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
217. Id. at 23 (citing to Ernst Benjamin, The Eroding Foundations of Academic Freedom and
Professional Integrity: Implications of the Diminishing Proportion of Tenured Faculty for Organi-
zational Effectiveness in Higher Education, J. ACAD. FREEDOM 1 (2010), https://www.aaup.org/
sites/default/files/Benjamin_0.pdf.).
218. This is in addition to the reduction in free speech that occurs when less faculty are re-
searching and writing, when scholarship is devalued, not required or not recognized as essential to
the educational mission.
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reasonable interpretations. Yet it is the AAUP—not the American Associa-
tion of Law Schools (AALS) or the Society of American Law Teachers
(SALT)—that issued the scathing Report. The AAUP issued its draft report
in March 2016, asking for comment before issuing its final report in June
2016. Outside of the few members on the subcommittee from law schools,
there was no systematic effort on the part of legal academia to address the
issue.219
As noted above, the response to the AAUP Report from the legal pro-
fession and legal academia is uncertain at this point. While the American
Law Institute (ALI) is working on a project on this topic, it is too early to
tell whether the ALI is sympathetic to the AAUP Report.220 A large number
of law professors have signed on to a White Paper defending the OCR’s
standard of proof in Title IX cases.221 Some of those signing on to the
White Paper are advisors and members of the consultative group to the ALI
project.222 A group called Faculty Against Rape (FAR) is also critical of the
AAUP Report, and likewise supports the OCR’s standard in Title IX
cases.223
219. According to Professor Risa Lieberwitz, General Counsel of the American Association of
University Professors, and Chair of the subcommittee that drafted the AAUP Report, individual
law professors with expertise on Title IX and related areas commented on the draft. E-mail from
Risa L. Lieberwitz, General Counsel, American Association of University Professors to author
(Aug. 7, 2016) (on file with author). The AAUP Report notes the concerns raised by a number of
Harvard and University of Pennsylvania law professors. AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 11. See
Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 15,
2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment-poli
cy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html; see also David Rudovsky et al., Sexual Assault
Complaints: Protecting Complainants and the Accused Students at Universities (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://media.philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf. The topic of Title IX and free speech was also
discussed on a panel in the summer of 2016 at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools
Annual meeting.
220. The American Law Institute is working on a project concerning sexual and gender-based
misconduct on campuses which will address “reporting procedures; confidentiality; relationships
with police and local criminal justice; interim measures and support for complainants; investiga-
tion and adjudication; the role of lawyers; the creation and maintenance of records; sanctions or
remedies; and appeals” among other things. A.L.I., Student Sexual Misconduct: Procedural
Frameworks for Colleges and Universities, https://www.ali.org/projects/show/project-sexual-and-
gender-based-misconduct-campus-procedural-frameworks-and-analysis/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2018). According to the ALI Director Richard L. Revez, members signed up to the consultative
group on this project in record numbers. See Richard L. Revesz, Our New Projects, A.L.I. (Spring
2015), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/2015—ALI-Spring_Quarter
ly_Letter.pdf.
221. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 142.
222. Id.
223. See E-mail from Faculty Against Rape to Association of American University Professors
(Apr. 15, 2016), https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yXsrWoVGqN725vepBZfemKuhbUzbg
YiMo0ruX38qJJY/edit?pref=2&pli=1. In its conclusion FAR wrote:
While we applaud the AAUP for turning its attention to a matter of significant impor-
tance, we are seriously concerned about the manner in which it did so, the accuracy of
the report’s content, its failure to engage with a broad variety of perspectives, including
expert scholarship, and its framing may rather serve to entrench existing problems than
address them.
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Thus, while the AAUP argues that the OCR, and universities have
used Title IX to abuse free speech, there is no consensus that the OCR’s
interpretation that Title IX requires merely a preponderance of evidence is
either incorrect or the main problem. The problem in part is the heavy stick
that the OCR wields should it decide to take away federal funding for non-
compliance. As noted above, while no university has lost its funding based
on a Title IX violation yet, the threat of that loss has led to settlement
agreements that often require more than what Title IX requires on its
face.224 This should not come as a surprise. If a particular university has
failed to live up to its duties to ensure its students are not discriminated
against in their pursuit of an education, the school would likely need to take
more pro-active steps than otherwise required to remediate the situation and
make sure it is in compliance.225 Problems arise when other universities use
settlement agreements for the new baseline of compliance, such as when
agreements become models for risk-averse university administrators on
how to comply with Title IX.226 Thus, it is not that these institutions are
setting out to silence speech, but rather in their attempt to err on the side of
compliance, they are providing a more attentive ear to the complaints of
those who believe they are being assaulted, harassed, or subjected to a hos-
tile educational environment.
In the balance between free speech and equality, or the First Amend-
ment and Title IX, providing a more attentive and sympathetic ear results in
more weight shifting to the equality/Title IX side of the scale. A sympa-
thetic ear is, in effect, a more sensitive and responsive lever to pull on for
those seeking gender justice. Those complaining of discrimination and har-
assment are able to get further than before with their complaints. It stands to
reason that a more responsive lever will be used more often by those who
believe they have suffered an injustice, which may feed into their view of
themselves as righteous victims. If in fact our culture, particularly campus
culture, has become more sensitive, overprotective, and coddling, then stu-
dents may more readily perceive these injustices. If the student is our cus-
tomer and the customer is always right, then it follows that a student’s
Id.
224. See Moskovitz, supra note 119.
225. These settlement agreements are similar to the kind of prophylactic injunctions a court
might order for similar types of violations. As Thomas notes:
Prophylaxis is characterized by the specific precautionary measures imposed to address
causal factors with a nexus to continued violations. It is differentiated by the use of
precautions ordered to address secondary facilitators of harm to provide more effective
prevention. The additional steps reaching contributing causes are ordered with the pur-
pose of heading off the harm before it develops.
Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued Vitality of Prophylactic Relief, 27 REV. LITIG. 99, 101 (2007).
The steps that may be required of a university that has turned a blind eye to, or which has actively
covered up, sexual assaults and harassment on campus, are not the same as those that need be
taken at other universities that have a record of addressing these matters in a serious and balanced
fashion.
226. Id. See also AAUP Report, supra note 7, at 13, 21.
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perception of injustice must be injustice.227 Students may genuinely per-
ceive that they are being harassed or that they are in a hostile educational
environment in situations those of us of an earlier generation would con-
sider to be merely awkward, uncomfortable, or tolerably offensive. Thus,
for some critics, it is not the Title IX lever of justice that is the problem, but
rather its overuse and the overreaction by universities.228 For others, the
problem is campus culture. After addressing the virtues and shortcomings
of the AAUP Report, we will return to look more closely at the culture on
university campuses.
As demonstrated above, I do not fully endorse the AAUP Report. In
many respects, my differences amount to a matter of tone, attitude, or de-
gree. The legal academy does not fully support the AAUP Report because
many of the concerns raised in the AAUP Report are either already being
addressed or could be adequately addressed in law schools. I draw on a
recent Gallup poll and my own follow-up poll of over 180 law students to
show the story is more nuanced on law school campuses than on other cam-
puses. Although not insulated, the culture on law school campuses is differ-
ent from the wrecking ball approach on university campuses and in society
as a whole. Our popular political culture appears to put little value on con-
cepts like professionalism, dignity, debating ideas, and backing up asser-
tions with authority; law schools put a premium on these values. While
there is room for heated debate, law school discourse rarely results in pro-
tests,229 disinvitations,230 or shouting matches. Although bigoted and sexist
discourse sometimes occurs, it is contrary to our current professional
culture.
On the positive side, because of their culture of debating ideas and
valuing evidence and authority, law schools are well placed to guard against
227. See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10.
228. This is why there are so many countless examples of students and university administra-
tions overreacting to what would otherwise be protected speech. Note however there is likely a
gross under-reporting of incidents where college administrators are supporting free speech, or
when they get the balance between free speech and equal opportunity right.
229. Recent protests include those at Wittier Law School by students protesting the law school
shutting down. See Luke Money, Students Rally to Protest Decision to Close Whittier Law School,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/socal/daily-pilot/news/tn-dpt-me-whittier-
law-protest-20170421-story.html. Harvard law students protested the law school symbol, which
was a family crest of a former slave owner, in part by occupying a student lounge. See Rick Riley,
Harvard Law School Concedes to Protests, Drops Seal Tied to Slave Owner Isaac Royall, AT-
LANTA BLACK STAR (Mar. 15, 2016), http://atlantablackstar.com/2016/03/15/harvard-law-school-
concedes-to-protests-drops-seal-tied-to-slave-owner-isaac-royall/. University of Florida law stu-
dents protested against police brutality in 2016 with a “die in.” See Catherine Dickson, Students
stage die-in to protest police shootings, THE INDEPENDENT FLORIDA ALLIGATOR (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.alligator.org/news/campus/students-stage-die-in-to-protest-police-shootings/article_b
492523e-85fb-11e6-8561-e797d5571b63.html.
230. It is difficult to find examples of law schools disinviting speakers. See, e.g., Foundation
for Individual Rights in Education, Disinvitation Attempts, https://www.thefire.org/resources/dis
invitation-database/#home/?view_2_sort=field_6—desc&view_2_page=1 (last visited Oct. 27,
2018).
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the extremes of the wrecking ball because of their culture of debating ideas
and valuing evidence and authority. On the negative side, law schools are
partially insulated from expressive extremes because they are repressive en-
vironments where the stakes are high for those who take on extreme views
or who engage in more extreme forms of expressive conduct.231 While one
clearly should not over-glorify law school culture—especially some of its
more repressive aspects—perhaps there is value in giving it a closer look.
VII. CAMPUS CULTURE
Arguably, the problem is not so much the law, or the government’s
enforcement of the law, but rather today’s university campus culture. The
problem of campus culture is highlighted in the AAUP Report. While the
AAUP Report focuses on the administration’s role in emphasizing “bureau-
cratic and legalistic methods” of compliance, other authors focus on the
consumer expectations and demands that students and parents are putting
on universities.232 As a result of this consumer approach to education, stu-
dents are focused on getting the grade, the degree, or credential but not so
much on the education itself.233 Our current university culture is not pro-
ducing as many students who are willing or able to take on the kinds of
challenging learning experiences that lead to gains in thinking skills.234
They are not as able or willing to deal with ambiguities or to struggle
through the process; they want to know the rule or the answer.235 Not unlike
231. Does this in part explain why it is students at more elite law schools, like Harvard, Yale,
and N.Y.U. who are reported as engaging in protests? Are they so privileged they can afford to
engage in riskier expressive conduct than law students from lower ranked schools? See Terence P.
Jeffrey, Yale Students Protest, Disrupt Pro-Free Speech Event, CNS: BLOG (Nov. 9, 2015, 10:09
AM), http://www.cnsnews.com/blog/terence-p-jeffrey/yale-students-protest-disrupt-pro-free-
speech-event; see also Avrahm Berkowitz, The Day Free Speech Died at Harvard Law School,
OBSERVER (Apr. 3, 2016), http://observer.com/2016/04/the-day-free-speech-died-at-harvard-law-
school/. Note, what counts as a law school protest appears to be mild by most any standard. There
were some mild protests at the University of Illinois in 2016 when the law school invited Profes-
sor Harold Koh to speak. See Anna Carrera, People Protest Law School Speaker (Oct. 28, 2016,
6:48 PM), http://www.illinoishomepage.net/news/local-news/people-protest-law-school-speaker/
602901789. The peaceful protests were based on his role in the Obama administration’s predator
drone program. It’s not clear if any law students participated in the protest and the speech went
ahead without incident. In 2017, N.Y.U. law students peacefully protested the inclusion of Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement recruiters at their job fair in light of President Trump’s immi-
gration policies. See Kari Sonde & Kyla Bills, NYU Students Protest Inclusion of ICE Recruiters
in Law School Job Fair, N.Y.U. LOCAL (Feb. 2, 2017), https://nyulocal.com/nyu-students-protest-
inclusion-of-ice-recruiters-in-law-school-job-fair-189527647a11.
232. See Rebecca Flanagan, The Kids Aren’t Alright: Rethinking the Law Student Skills Defi-
cit, 2015 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 135, 155 (2015).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 137.
235. Id. at 155.
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the helicopter parents who raised this generation, helicopter professors may
be feeding the problem.236
Greg Lukianoff, Jonathan Haidt,237 Charles Lipson,238 and Rebecca
Flanagan239 describe campus culture as overprotective: coddling students
and their minds from topics that may cause them discomfort or pain.240 As
noted above, we seem to have gone from turning a blind eye to the “rape
culture” on campuses241 to one of “vindictive protectionism,”242 where
some students—even some law students—request rape not be discussed.243
When only 16 percent of college students think we do a good job of seeking
out and listening to different views, there is a problem.244 This culture,
while unhealthy at all levels of education, is particularly problematic in the
law school context.
This may be a problem caused by a vocal and mobilized minority, as
an overwhelming majority of college students (78 percent) state, “they pre-
ferred a campus ‘where students are exposed to all types of speech and
viewpoints,’ including offensive and biased speech, over a campus where
such speech is prohibited.”245 The same study, however, revealed 54 per-
cent of students said the climate on campus keeps students from saying
what they believe because others might find it offensive.246
236. Supra note 8 (“Helicopter professors, like their parenting counterparts, hover over stu-
dents, guiding them precisely, and swooping in to rescue them from any hint of failure or chal-
lenge. Just as helicopter parenting can be harmful to children, helicopter professoring poses
similar threats to students, not the least of which is creating disengaged students dependent on
professors for all aspects of their learning and development.”).
237. See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10.
238. Charles Lipson, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, echoes many
of the concerns of the AAUP Report regarding threats to free speech on campus and provides a
five-step remedy for universities to ensure free speech and academic freedom. See Lipson, supra
note 14.
239. See Flanagan, supra note 232 (summarizing data and observations suggesting a decline in
student preparedness for law school, due in part to the corporate culture of higher education and
the consumer attitude of students and their parents).
240. The University of Chicago has joined with the critics of this culture in its letter from the
Dean of Students to the Class of 2020. See Perez-Pen˜a, Smith & Saul, supra note 13.
241. Rape culture is a term that originated in the 1970’s to describe the ways in which society
blames victims of sexual assault and sees male sexual violence as normal. See, e.g., Zerlina Max-
well, Rape Culture Is Real, TIME, (Mar. 27, 2014), http://time.com/40110/rape-culture-is-real/.
242. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10.
243. See Suk Gersen, supra note 147. It may be only students at Harvard are making such
demands and I am not aware of any professor who has capitulated to such demands. There have
been no such demands at my institution and the professors who teach criminal law all address the
subject.
244. See KNIGHT FOUND., Free Speech on Campus: A Survey of U.S. College Students and
U.S. Adults 4 (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publications_pdfs/
FreeSpeech_campus.pdf.
245. See id.
246. Id.
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VIII. MENTALLY ILL CAMPUS CULTURE?
In 2015, First Amendment lawyer Greg Lukianoff and social psychol-
ogist Jonathan Haidt foreshadowed many of the observations and conclu-
sions made in the AAUP. Lukianoff and Haidt, however, further included a
mental health dimension missing from the AAUP Report.247 The current
approach is not only bad for our students’ mental health—which further
distorts the speech that takes place—it harms their educational and career
prospects.248 Unlike the AAUP Report, their focus has less to do with ad-
ministrative structures and more to do with giving students tools to confront
opposing and uncomfortable ideas and speech in a healthy (rather than path-
ological) manner.249
Charles Lipson, a political science professor at the University of Chi-
cago, begins his short piece with a description of a class exercise at the
University of Northern Colorado where professors asked their students to
read Lukianoff and Haidt’s article on free speech250 and to come up with
their own list of “difficult topics.” The Northern Colorado professors’ mis-
take appears to have been to include transgender issues in a list of examples
of difficult topics that included abortion, gay marriage, and climate
change.251 According to Lipson, a student complained, “Transgender is not
a ‘difficult topic.’ It’s beyond debate because she views herself that way.
To even discuss it would violate her safety.”252 Lipson explains, “‘Safety’
as it happens, is a magic word on campus. It has its own special meaning,
well beyond legitimate concerns about robbery, sexual assaults, and coer-
cive threats.”253 Rather, for some students, it has come to mean, “I feel
unsafe because I disagree with your ideas. So, shut up. Right now.”254 Lip-
247. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10. The authors’ focus is not so much on the Department
of Education and administrators as it is on students who have learned to expect trigger warnings,
are extra sensitive to microaggressions, and who have become increasingly polarized and closed
off to those they disagree with.
248. Id.
249. Id. As they argue:
The biggest single step in the right direction does not involve faculty or university ad-
ministrators, but rather the federal government, which should release universities from
their fear of unreasonable investigation and sanctions by the Department of Education.
Congress should define peer-on-peer harassment according to the Supreme Court’s defi-
nition in the 1999 case, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education (526 US 629
(1999)). The Davis standard holds a single comment or thoughtless remark by a student
does not equal harassment; harassment requires a pattern of objectively offensive behav-
ior by one student interferes with another student’s access to education. Establishing the
Davis standard would help eliminate universities’ impulse to police their students’
speech so carefully.
Id.
250. Lipson, supra note 14.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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son analogizes this to pulling a fire alarm, “but with no sense of what a fire
really is and no penalty for false alarms.”255
Lipson argues the healthy administrative response to a student would
be to explain the virtues of free speech in the classroom,256 provide coun-
seling support, if needed, and provide immediate help for real safety threats.
The healthy response, absent any real threat, would be to tell the student,
“Do the assignment, develop your own views, buttress them with logic and
evidence, and prepare to deal with alternative perspectives.”257 Lipson ar-
gues, however, this would not be the likely response. Rather, he argues,
“Today, dean-of-students’ offices are devoted to comforting delicate snow-
flakes and soothing their feelings. If that means stamping out others’
speech, too bad.”258
In the article that sparked controversy at the University of Northern
Colorado, Lukianoff and Haidt argue the trend towards vindictive protec-
tionism, with its focus on micro-aggressions and trigger warnings,259 is an
unhealthy response to things that offend us and cause us emotional discom-
fort.260 Lukianoff and Haidt explain:
[Vindictive protectionism] prepares [students] poorly for profes-
sional life, which often demands intellectual engagement with
people and ideas one might find uncongenial or wrong. The harm
may be more immediate, too. A campus culture devoted to polic-
ing speech and punishing speakers is likely to engender patterns
of thought that are surprisingly similar to those long identified by
cognitive behavioral therapists as causes of depression and anxi-
ety. The new protectiveness may be teaching students to think
pathologically.261
255. Id.
256. According to Lipson those virtues would include “having a challenging environment with
‘spirited, informed debate,’ “and may “occasionally prompt students to rethink their views and
offer better reasons for them.” See Lipson, supra note 14.
257. See id.
258. Id. Although Lipson’s recommendations are quite reasonable, his tone is reminiscent of
President Business in the Lego Movie, where he states to Emmet (the ultra-ordinary guy, known
as “The Special”): “Hey, not so special anymore, huh? Well, guess what? No one ever told me I
was special. I never got a trophy just for showing up! I’m not some special little snowflake, no!
But as unspecial [sic] as I am, you are a thousand billion times more unspecial [sic] than me!” THE
LEGO MOVIE (Warner Bros. 2014).
259. They attribute this change in ethos to a number of factors including: “recent changes in
the interpretation of federal antidiscrimination statutes,” the shift from “free range” parenting to
more protective parenting, (sometimes called “helicopter” parenting) where parents sought to keep
their children safe in public and in schools from all things dangerous, including bullying, and the
polarization of politics where groups tend to demonize each other. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note
10.
260. Id.
261. Id. The authors note mental-health directors are almost universally reporting increases in
the number of students with severe psychological problems, and:
54 percent of college students surveyed said they had ‘felt overwhelming anxiety’ in the
past 12 months, up from 49 percent in the same survey just five years earlier. Students
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Distorted pathological thinking is not only bad for one’s mental
health—it has a distorting effect on speech. When this distortion is not iso-
lated and becomes widespread, the costs to both are potentially exponential.
Lukianoff and Haidt’s analysis of recent trends in higher education high-
lights a number of problems, including:
• higher education’s embrace of “emotional reasoning,”262
• fortune-telling and trigger warnings,263
• magnification, labeling, and microaggressions,264
• teaching students to catastrophize and have zero tolerance,265 and
• mental filtering and speaker disinvitations.266
Lukianoff and Haidt argue higher education’s embrace of “emotional
reasoning” teaches students to be hypersensitive and prone to countless
drawn-out conflicts that will be damaging to their careers, friendships, and
mental health.267 The situation has developed to where simply stating one is
offended becomes a trump card played by each opposing party. According
to Lukianoff and Haidt, because universities fear federal investigations, uni-
versities have abandoned an objective reasonable person standard of offen-
siveness, and “are now applying [a subjective standard]—defining
unwelcome speech as harassment—not just to sex, but to race, religion, and
veteran status as well.”268 The result is trending towards a state of emo-
tional warfare.
Lukianoff and Haidt also criticize trigger warnings. They note, “Ac-
cording to the most-basic tenets of psychology, the very idea of helping
people with anxiety disorders avoid the things they fear is misguided.”269
seem to be reporting more emotional crises; many seem fragile, and this has surely
changed the way university faculty and administrators interact with them.
Id.
262. Emotional reasoning is assuming “that your negative emotions necessarily reflect the
way things really are: ‘I feel it, therefore it must be true.’” Id. (quoting DAVID D. BURNS, THE
FEELING GOOD HANDBOOK (1999)). In other words, it is when “your feelings guide your interpre-
tation of reality.” Id. (quoting ROBERT L. LEAHY, STEPHEN J. F. HOLLAND, & LATA K. MCGINN,
TREATMENT PLANS AND INTERVENTIONS FOR DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY DISORDERS (2d ed.
2011)).
263. Fortune-telling is “anticipat[ing] that things will turn out badly” and feeling “convinced
that your prediction is an already-established fact.” Id. (quoting BURNS, supra note 262). The
authors’ note demands for trigger warnings on reading assignments with provocative content is an
example of fortune-telling. See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10.
264. Magnification is “exaggerat[ing] the importance of things,” Id. (quoting BURNS, supra
note 262) and labeling is “assign[ing] global negative traits to yourself and others.” Id. (quoting
LEAHY, HOLLAND & MCGINN, supra note 262).
265. Catastrophizing is turning “commonplace negative events into nightmarish monsters.” Id.
(quoting BURNS, supra note 262).
266. Mental filtering is “pick[ing] out a negative detail in any situation and dwell[ing] on it
exclusively, thus perceiving that the whole situation is negative.” Id. (quoting BURNS, supra note
262). As the authors note, this allows for simpleminded demonization. Id.
267. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10.
268. Id.
269. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 60  4-JAN-19 11:27
2018] FREE SPEECH ON THE LAW SCHOOL CAMPUS 85
Trigger warnings, they say, may “foster unhealthy mental habits in the
vastly larger group of students who do not suffer from PTSD or other anxi-
ety disorders.”270 The authors do not have a problem with identifying topics
that trigger emotional responses. They argue, however, identification should
not lead to avoidance. It is healthier to confront triggering topics in the
relatively safe setting of a classroom than in the world outside. Further, by
drawing extra attention to the dangers of certain topics, students who would
not normally be triggered may come to fear difficult topics.271
Similarly, the authors are not critical of the idea of studying microag-
gressions but are critical of the way they are magnified. For example, stu-
dents “focus on [microaggressions] and then relabel the people who have
made such remarks as aggressors.”272 It is one thing to raise awareness and
another to label those who may inadvertently slight others—due to igno-
rance or thoughtlessness—as aggressors. Lukianoff and Haidt worry a focus
on microaggressions takes away from more serious problems like macroag-
gressions, a macroaggression simply being an overt or large-scale form of
aggression.
William B. Irvine argues for a different approach: students should take
a stoic approach to insults, transforming themselves into “insult paci-
fists.”273 He contends that you minimize the harm and the chances that an
insulter will insult you again if you either ignore the comment or respond
with laughter.274 According to Irvine, we react negatively to insults, in large
part, because of our concern about social status; if we held better, more
stoic values, we would not feel the sting of such insults.275
Irvine makes a good point here, but it is worth noting it is much easier
for those who already have a relatively high and stable social status to care
less about social status or what others think of them. It is easier to “care
less” about what others think if your culture already embraces you and
gives you the benefit of the doubt. If you are a minority, or if you cut
270. Id.
271. The authors quote the psychiatrist Sarah Roff who states, “One of my biggest concerns
about trigger warnings. . .is they will apply not just to those who have experienced trauma, but to
all students, creating an atmosphere in which they are encouraged to believe there is something
dangerous or damaging about discussing difficult aspects of our history.” Id.
272. Id.
273. See WILLIAM B. IRVINE, A SLAP IN THE FACE: WHY INSULTS HURT—AND WHY THEY
SHOULDN’T, at ix, 17, 145–231 (2017).
274. Id. Irvine makes light of microaggressions by asking “what next, one wonders, Nano-
aggression?” Id. at viii. Irvine uses the examples of asking a person of color where they are from
or complementing their articulateness. While these aren’t the worst things to say, the former may
imply one is not as “from here” as the person asking (especially if it is followed up with, “no
really, where are you from”), and the latter may imply most people like the person complimented
are not articulate. Both raise teaching moments. It does not take a great deal of tact to understand
that asking someone who appears to have ancestors from the Middle East where they are from is
very different from asking someone who appears to have ancestors from northern Europe the same
question. Context matters. Id.
275. Id. at 190-92.
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against the grain of the mainstream society, then what other people think of
you matters, not only on the psychological level, but also on the level of
how you are treated, how your performance is evaluated, and whether or not
you can get a good reference or job. So, while micro-insults and micro-
indignities are molehills to some, they can actually be mountains to others,
and for good reason.
Although the AAUP Report does not address it, microaggressions have
come to campus. As with trigger warnings, there is nothing wrong with
being sensitive to the harm you might cause with your choice of words. It is
good to draw attention to and challenge words based on unstated and
demeaning premises, stereotypes, and overgeneralizations. The term
“microaggression” is a poor term if it is applied to all things said that cause
small amounts of emotional harm. The term is defined as “brief and com-
monplace daily verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether
intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or nega-
tive . . . slights and insults toward people of [a given group].”276 While the
term as defined includes unintentional behavior, the term on its face as-
sumes an aggressor.277 The term “microaggression” overgeneralizes slights
as acts of aggression. Some students have come to take the more literal
approach to the term in their desire to see microaggressions taken seriously.
As Lukianoff and Haidt note:
[S]tudent government at Ithaca College . . . went so far as to pro-
pose the creation of an anonymous microaggression-reporting
system. Student sponsors envisioned some form of disciplinary
action against “oppressors” engaged in belittling speech. One of
the sponsors of the program said that while “not . . . every in-
stance will require trial or some kind of harsh punishment,” she
wanted the program to be “record-keeping but with impact.”278
If those who are concerned about micro-indignities overgeneralize
them all as forms of aggression, there is a risk of a backlash by those who
may be labeled as aggressors, or those who are sympathetic to those who
are so labeled for their poor choice of words. In our ever increasingly po-
larized world, the result is not appropriate sensitivity to the things that cause
harm but a rejection of the claims by those who are “overly sensitive.”
Calling or labeling someone an aggressor is not conducive to healthy dia-
276. Derald Wing Sue, Christina M. Capodilupo, Gina C. Torino, Jennifer M. Bucceri, Aisha
M. B. Holder & Marta Esquilin, Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for
Clinical Practice, 62 (4) AM. PSYCHOL. 271, 271 (May/June 2007). The term originally adopted in
the race context has now extended to nearly all social groups. See, e.g., DERALD WING SUE,
MICROAGGRESSIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION (2010).
277. The authors of Racial Microaggression note microaggressions can take the form of
microassault, microinsult, and microinvalidation which do not all include intentional harm. Sue, et
al., Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice, supra note 276.
278. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10. Students at Princeton also have a site for students to
report microaggressions.
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logue about the harm being caused. Rather, it tends to shut down the con-
versation. If one did not consciously intend the harm they may be open to a
claim that one felt hurt by a comment and may even be willing to explore
the hidden premise or their ignorance about what their choice of language
may imply. They may even become an ally to the cause. This potential for
healthy dialogue, learning, and growth is often lost when a claim overgener-
alizes or attributes mal-intent when it was not intended. The label of
microaggression has itself become a microaggression. Potential allies are
now enemies whose minds are closed off to the other’s claims.279
Focusing on intent might be missing the point. While it is worse when
one intends to cause harm or offense, it is not acceptable to hide behind
well intended ignorance. Micro-indignities are not only harmful if one im-
putes intent. Micro-indignities often reinforce negative stereotypes that sup-
port and maintain a form of segregation. Here, like in the case of the
physical segregation of minorities, separate is decidedly not equal. Ac-
knowledging micro-indignities that reinforce a negative social status for
some is worthwhile.
Lukianoff and Haidt warn that focusing on macroaggressions feeds
into the mental filtering and demonizing of those who don’t share one’s
views, resulting in a growing trend to disinvite speakers on campus based
on a limited number of things they have said or done.280 They note, “Ac-
cording to data compiled by the Foundation for Individual Rights in Educa-
tion, since 2000, at least 240 campaigns have been launched at U.S.
universities to prevent public figures from appearing at campus events;
most of them have occurred since 2009.”281 This widespread trend allows
students to avoid diverse viewpoints and conveys a message that speakers
should be “pure” and should not offend campus sensibilities. Perhaps
worse, it suggests that nothing can be learned from those with opposing
views; this mindset does not serve students well for life beyond school.282
Here again, I would caution against giving this otherwise legitimate
point of view too much weight. The risk (perhaps coming into fruition) is
that the backlash against these trends of avoidance will be used to leverage
279. Note the point of the author’s study of microaggressions was to look at their negative
impact on the development of a therapeutic alliance between therapist and patient. While microag-
gressions surely threaten relationships so does the abuse of the term in labelling those who cause
micro-harm as aggressors.
280. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10. This point ties in with Lispon’s article where he
describes small bureaucracies with Orwellian Titles such as “the Office for Diversity and Inclu-
sion.” According to Lipson, these offices are not in fact inclusive of diverse viewpoints, but rather
“are university-sponsored advocates for approved minorities, approved viewpoints, and approved
grievances. Full stop.” Lipson, supra note 14. Such offices are likely to take campaigns to dis-
invite speakers seriously.
281. Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10.
282. Id.
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the views (or antics) of hate groups and extremists, such as the alt-right.283
The alt-right has targeted public universities because the First Amendment
gives them access and because universities embrace the ideals they loathe:
inclusiveness, diversity, and tolerance.284 While most speakers would dread
a speech that turned hostile, violent, or resulted in being shouted down, the
alt-right appears to revel in it. While I am hesitant to completely dismiss the
idea that alt-right speakers are on campus to discuss ideas and persuade
students to their ways of thinking, some argue they are more interested in
the spectacle as a way of playing to their base of supporters off campus.285
Even a disinvitation is a win of sorts because it allows them to pull out what
the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) calls their “favorite bludgeon”:
political correctness.286 As the SPLC puts it, they use this bludgeon as a
“[a] cheap and easy way to dismiss community norms and basic human
decency, and to undermine the fundamental American values of equality,
justice and fairness.”287 For those who care about free speech, it is worth
being careful about our own rhetoric, lest it provide fuel for the proverbial
fire.
IX. IF THE PROBLEM IS BASED IN CAMPUS CULTURE, IS THE LAW
SCHOOL CAMPUS CULTURE DIFFERENT?
In late 2016, I conducted a survey of 180 law students by adapting a
Gallup poll given earlier that year to college students and adults.288 My
results revealed law students preferred a positive learning environment that
curtailed some offensive and biased speech (54.27%) to an open environ-
283. As described by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), the alt-right “revels in notori-
ety. Much of its drawing power is the provocative and crude manner in which alt-right speakers
rail against the established order. Posing as underdogs, they hurl insults against the walls of au-
thority, decency and civil discourse using memes, juvenile humor and pseudo-intellectual argu-
ments to deliver their message.” Southern Poverty Law Center, The Alt-Right on Campus: What
Students Need to Know, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/
20170810/alt-right-campus-what-students-need-know.
284. Id.
285. As Chris Ladd, a former GOP precinct committeeman, argues, “Conservatives aren’t
sending Ann Coulter to Berkeley as a missionary. They are sending her to get B-reel footage they
can play in fundraising pitches to aging Alabamans. She is there to incite violence. If no one sets
anything on fire, then they’ve failed.” Ladd, supra note 9.
286. For instance, the Southern Poverty Law Center provides the following advice for dealing
with “alt-right” hate group personalities coming to campus:
When an alt-right personality is scheduled to speak on campus, the most effective
course of action is to deprive the speaker of the thing he or she wants most – a spectacle.
Alt-right personalities know their cause is helped by news footage of large jeering
crowds, heated confrontations and outright violence at their events. It allows them to
play the victim and gives them a larger platform for their racist message.
SPLC, supra note 283.
287. The SPLC also states: “They charge that progressive college campuses are mired in
meaningless, discriminatory rules as they embrace and protect individual differences. They claim
these efforts are appeasements to individuals who might have their feelings hurt.” Id.
288. See KNIGHT FOUND., supra note 244.
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ment that allowed such speech (45.73%).289 Though firmly opposed to poli-
cies that restricted “expressing political views that are upsetting or
offensive to certain groups” (90.18%), law students were firmly in favor of
policies that restrict “using slurs and other language on campus that is in-
tentionally offensive to certain groups” (81.21%).290 Nonetheless, law stu-
dents strongly agreed “the climate on campus prevents some people from
saying things they believe because others might find them offensive” (60%
strongly agree, 18.75% somewhat agree, 13.75% somewhat disagree, and
only 7.5% strongly disagree).291
Thus, while law students in this small sample believe they do not al-
ways say what they believe, they also do not think they should say every-
thing they might believe, or at least should be careful in how they say it. For
the law students, free speech does not necessarily trump a positive learning
environment. They seemed to appreciate that intentionally offensive slurs
did not promote a healthy learning environment. The surveyed law students
differentiated between words that were merely offensive or upsetting and
the use of slurs and intentionally offensive language. One should be able to
talk about politically sensitive topics, and even racially sensitive topics, but
not every way of talking about these topics is equally valued or seen as
appropriate. Perhaps the law students appreciate that racial slurs simply do
not move a conversation forward. A slur has little to no truth content or
value, and thus there is little lost in prohibiting it. Rather, there is positive
harm by allowing it on campus, as this way of speaking tends to derail the
conversation and disrupt a healthy learning environment.292
Observations about the current climate on university campuses across
the country are not equally applicable to law school campuses. Unquestion-
ably, university corporatization and the relative lack of faculty self-govern-
ance or input into policies has impacted the balance between free speech
and ensuring compliance with civil rights legislation. But most law profes-
289. The question asked was:
If you had to choose, do you think it is more important for law schools to: create a
positive learning environment for all students by prohibiting certain speech or expres-
sion of viewpoints that are offensive or biased against certain groups of people, or to
create an open learning environment where students are exposed to all types of speech
and viewpoints, even if it means allowing speech is offensive or biased against certain
groups of people?
Florida Coastal Law Student Survey from Christopher J. Roederer, L. Professor (Feb. 9, 2017).
Note this was a one-time survey of students at one law school. I do not mean to claim they are
necessarily representative of law student views in general.
290. The question asked: “Do you think law schools should or should not be able to establish
policies that restrict each of the following types of speech or expression on campus?:
• Expressing political views that are upsetting or offensive to certain groups
• Using slurs and other language on campus that is intentionally offensive to certain
groups.”
Id.
291. Id.
292. Of course, these surveys did not address what kinds of sanctions would be appropriate for
students who violated such norms or policies.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\15-1\UST102.txt unknown Seq: 65  4-JAN-19 11:27
90 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1
sors do not seem concerned that their institutions have gotten this balance
wrong. This may be because law professors are generally good at getting
their voices heard and so might have more local control over the process
than other professors within the university. There is no question undergrad-
uate culture impacts law school culture, since this is the path our students
travel. They no-doubt bring their undergraduate expectations and baggage
with them when they come to law school. But law schools have always
confronted the challenge of re-orienting students to law school culture and
expectations.
Many aspects of law school culture are designed to address or counter-
act the concerns raised by the AAUP Report and authors like Lukianoff and
Haidt. While there are some issues with requiring all law professors be
mandatory reporters, the law professors who have the skills and training (or
who are willing to undergo training) should be able to lobby for confiden-
tial status. As noted above, law professors can (or should be able to) respon-
sibly engage and navigate trigger warnings without avoiding important
issues and topics. Important and difficult topics are at the core of what we
address in law school. Thus, we can handle the responsible use of trigger
warnings without falling into fortune telling and emotional reasoning. As a
rule, we make it a point to reject purely emotional reasoning in the class-
room. We should be able to distinguish—and teach our students to distin-
guish—between true aggression and micro-indignities, even at the micro-
level. We should also be able to tailor proportional remedies to such indig-
nities. We can identify when students are using buzz words (like “unsafe”
or “harassed”) and can look behind the rhetoric for substance, evidence, and
support.
X. BEYOND THE WRECKING BALL: GETTING BACK TO THE HAMMER
IN THE CLASSROOM
At law schools, the current trend towards coddling or “vindictive pro-
tectiveness” (along with all its unhealthy consequences)293 is itself a reac-
tion (and perhaps an overreaction) to harms caused by the adversative
approach to legal education: the traditional Socratic method.294 As noted by
Jamie R. Abrams, the Socratic method has been subjected to “widespread
critique from various stakeholders” who have “questioned its pedagogical
effectiveness,” “criticized its disproportionately marginalizing effect on wo-
men and minority law students,” and consider it responsible for “the general
malaise and depression of modern law students.”295 For those reasons, some
faculty have moved away from the traditional Socratic method.
293. See Lukianoff & Haidt, supra note 10.
294. As Jamie R. Abrams notes, “[t]he Socratic method persists and endures in law teaching,
even while it is increasingly surrounded by innovation and its use is declining.” Jamie R. Abrams,
Reframing the Socratic Method, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562, 563 (2015).
295. Id. at 566.
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The Socratic method is not efficient if students are not adequately pre-
pared.296 Some research suggests today’s students are not as prepared for
the rigors of law school as they were a decade ago.297 Consistent with
AAUP Report, Flanagan notes today’s college students approach their edu-
cation with a consumerist orientation.298 She notes this corresponds to a
decline in study time and in what we might term “grit.”299 Flanagan writes,
“Students with extrinsic motivation, such as a consumer orientation toward
college, are less likely to seek and persist at challenging learning exper-
iences that lead to gains in thinking skills.”300 For law professors, there is a
sense that today’s students want more spoon feeding, hand holding, and
continuous feedback (preferably positive).301 Some students seem to expect
the client letter or memo from their professors and are not all that invested
in developing the skills they will someday need to write that letter, or pro-
duce that memo. The law school Socratic method, where the professor re-
lentlessly interrogates students but provides little explanation or context,
does not jibe well with this type of student. In its harsher forms, the So-
cratic method displaces one set of extrinsic motivators (e.g. the desire to get
good grades in law school so one can someday be a rich lawyer or have a
healthy work/life balance) to one that is motivated by the fear that one will
be called out and humiliated in class.
296. Thus, many professors either flip their classes, ask for volunteers, or have groups or rows
on call.
297. See Flanagan, supra note 232, at 139-47. As she notes:
The lamentation of law professors’ students ‘just aren’t what they used to be’ is more
than the idle chatter of ageing academics. Most entering law students know less than
prior generations of law students. Students have found maximizing grades, minimizing
study time, and focusing on the credentialing aspect of college education results in a
more pleasurable, less stressful experience, but one leaves them ill-prepared for higher-
level intellectual tasks. The undergraduate experience has changed from one of intellec-
tual rigor and exploration to one that focuses on personal pleasure, much like a four-year
vacation.
Id. at 170-71.
298. This has taken place since the 1980s. Id. at 153-54. She also notes that:
Many of today’s college graduates do not have the fundamental thinking and reasoning
skills necessary to master the law school curriculum. College students spend less time
studying during their undergraduate years. College students expect higher grades with
considerably less effort than previous generations. . . . College students learn to ‘game’
their education, working less while receiving higher grades, but failing to acquire the
thinking skills that provide the foundation for later success.
Id. at 135-36.
299. See id. at 136-37; She notes:
Recent research has found that instrumental motives, or motives extrinsic to the primary
activity, weakens internal, intrinsic motivation. When people hold both instrumental
motivations, (such as a desire for good grades) as well as intrinsic motivations, (such as
a desire to learn and understand) the instrumental motives undermine or “crowd out” the
intrinsic motivation, and lead to lower motivation, persistence, and performance.
Id. at 154-55.
300. Id. at 155.
301. This is, after all, the trophy generation, where students have been raised to expect posi-
tive feedback for showing up. See James Bennet, The Trophy Generation, THE ATLANTIC (July/
Aug. 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/07/the-trophy-generation/30854
2/.
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If students are coming into law school with both a skills deficit and an
unhealthy consumer attitude, more will be required than simply free speech
to prepare them to be functioning lawyers. As Flanagan notes:
[A] customer orientation reduces the opportunity for students to
challenge themselves, to “engage with ambiguities,” and risk fail-
ure in order to grow intellectually and personally. Because an es-
sential element of legal education is the ability to “grapple with
uncertainty in order to develop professional judgment,” college
students’ consumer orientation leaves them unprepared for the
pedagogical challenges they must face as law students.302
Legal academia needs to be careful at this juncture. The appropriate
response to a wrecking ball that has swung to the point of vindictive protec-
tionism is not to swing it back to reckless indifference. Both extremes are
associated with poor mental health.303 The classroom itself does not appear
to be the main stressor at law school these days.304 There is perhaps a little
bit of nostalgia for the days when it was: the days when students did not ask
questions (inside or outside of class, even about the exam); the days when
law professors forged students into sharp legal weapons by continuously
hammering them with questions;305 the days when students were expected
to teach themselves the law before coming to class, where their skills and
knowledge would be put to the test; the days when it was thought that the
Socratic method would best prepare them for the rough and tumble hierar-
chical adversarial profession.306 We all want our students to take responsi-
bility for their education, to work harder, to be more prepared, to be more
resilient, and to not complain about every little thing that might make them
302. Flanagan, supra note 232, at 155.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 247-49, 295.
304. According to the Law School Survey of Student Engagement Report, 50 percent of stu-
dents reported high stress, 46 percent reported medium levels of stress, and 4 percent reported low
levels of stress. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, HOW A DECADE OF DEBT
CHANGED L. STUDENT EXPERIENCE 17 (2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/lssse-annual-
report-2015.pdf. When asked whether the following six common stressors actually caused them
stress, only 32 percent listed “classroom environment/teaching” while 33 percent indicated “com-
petition” caused them stress. The remaining stressors received higher percentages, namely “aca-
demic performance” at 78 percent, “academic workload” at 74 percent, “job prospects” 62
percent, and “financial concerns/student debt” at 51 percent. Id.
305. Or destroyed them in the process. As David Garner notes, “Advocates . . . tout the So-
cratic method as a form of ‘ritualized combat,’ a ‘civilized battle,’ a ‘boot camp’ of sorts, in which
professors utterly ‘destroy’ students by making ‘friendly assault[s]’ on their answers.” David D.
Garner, Socratic Misogyny?–Analyzing Feminist Criticisms of Socratic Teaching in Legal Educa-
tion, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2000) (arguing for reform in the use of the Socratic
Method in legal education). Advocates also point out the Socratic method is good for sharpening
analytic and critical thinking skills.
306. In the words of Duncan Kennedy, legal education is a training ground for hierarchy. See
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 54, 54-58
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed., 1998). Note these were perhaps also the days when microaggressions
and the traumatizing treatment of delicate materials would go unchallenged.
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uncomfortable.307 However, given the culture our students are coming
from, it is doubtful that a return to a hard Socratic method would achieve
these goals.
The challenge is to keep the baby in the tub while draining the bath
water: to push students, or motivate them, without pushing them over the
edge or shutting them down. It is difficult to know how many law students
regret going to law school after their first semester yet stay and muddle
through due to extrinsic pressure, be it the embarrassment of failure or law
school debt.308 While part of the traditional Socratic method remains, the
trend has moved to flipping classrooms,309 skills exercises, practice simula-
tions, teamwork, and multicultural competencies.310 Perhaps we have gone
too far in making the classroom comfortable, in holding hands with multi-
ple formative and summative assessments and continuous feedback. None-
theless, swinging back to fourteen callous and cold weeks of interrogation
followed by a mystery exam is neither desirable nor likely.
I don’t think there is one simple answer. The truth is complicated, and
I think students benefit from a variety of teaching methods and approaches
across different courses. In addition to the above teaching methods, some
have argued the Socratic method could be altered to put clients (instead of
rules) at the center, which might help motivate students to engage with the
law.311
While students can learn from numerous approaches, it is difficult to
learn or contribute to the learning of others if one perceives the learning
environment to be hostile.312 Of course, learning environments can be de-
307. At least one panelist at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools conference wished
all students watched The Paper Chase, so they would appreciate just how good they have it now.
The Paper Chase, the movie, is based on John Jay Osborn, Jr.’s novel, The Paper Chase (1971),
and follows the struggles of a first-year law student at Harvard Law. Colleen Walsh, ‘The Paper
Chase’ at 40, THE HARVARD GAZETTE, (Oct. 2, 2012), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/
10/the-paper-chase-at-40/.
308. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, supra note 304.
309. In the flipped classroom, the professor records a lecture students can listen to or watch in
advance so class time can be spent working through problems and hypotheticals. Of course, the
traditional model of legal education was also flipped in the sense that students were expected to
answer their professors’ questions rather than ask their own. The difference was students were
expected to teach themselves the law by reading and briefing cases before class in preparation for
the numerous hypothetical questions they would receive in class.
310. See Abrams, supra note 294.
311. Id. at 563. Abrams goes a bit further and argues the Socratic method could be improved if
it were “reframed in three simple ways to make it client focused, research-focused, and skills-
sensitization focused.” Id. at 568. Florida Coastal’s Director of Experiential Learning, Professor
Curran, notes how much harder students are willing to work in clinics when they see the law in
action, faced with actual clients and meaningful work. Abrams argues, “[t]his approach best repli-
cates law practice in which clients’ needs and legal authority shape case outcomes and strategy. It
also softens the teacher-student hierarchy by positioning the client as the point of inquiry, invites
diverse participation, and is more transferable to other law courses and experiences.” Id.
312. Little things can add up to bigger things if they are left unchecked. Showing a lack of
concern for little things can make them big things that distract from the learning environment.
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manding and challenging without being hostile, and just because someone
perceives an environment to be hostile does not mean it actually is or that
anyone intended to make it so. Difficult topics should be learning moments,
not landmines. Most law professors have the skills to clear these mines,
challenge their students, be rigorous, and hold them accountable without
being callous or insensitive to the things that might get in the way of
learning.313
313. In closing, I cannot help thinking of my own model law professor, Professor Charles
Knapp, otherwise nicknamed by his students as the “reasonable person” even though his course
was contracts and not torts. His class was not easy, but he was not cruel. He always appeared
happy and genuinely interested in the responses he elicited from his students. He always seemed
more interested in building students up and raising the level of conversation than in tearing people
down. There was nothing particularly fancy or novel in his approach to teaching; it seemed very
reasonable to me and to many of my fellow classmates at the time.
